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CONSULTANTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND
THE LAW
Dave Owen*
Conventional wisdom assumes that private-sector businesses will oppose,
undermine, or distort government regulation. That assumption also underpins many
areas of theoretical inquiry; theorists commonly assume that effective public-law
regimes must be protected from the self-interested machinations of businesses, or
that such protection is such a lost cause that most public regulation is doomed to
fail. This Article investigates a different set of relationships between businesses and
regulation. It does so by using the environmental consulting industry, which helps
businesses and governments comply with environmental regulations, as a case
study. An empirical inquiry into two subfields of the industry reveals that for-profit,
private-sector actors can play distinctive and active roles in public-law regimes,
and that these distinctive roles are motivated by a combination of economic
incentives and cultural orientation. These findings have direct implications for
several areas of inquiry, including studies of public choice theory, privatization,
social movements, and the historic evolution of environmental regulation. Most
importantly, they reveal how private actors can bolster public law.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day, thousands of businesses must navigate the complex demands of
governmental regulation, and thousands of regulators must work with businesses.
Conventional wisdom predicts that these interactions usually will be adversarial and
often will be completely dysfunctional. Stories of nefarious, law-evading
corporations and of "job-killing regulations" are standard fare in both politics and
popular culture.'
That conventional wisdom also permeates theories of regulation. Scholars
and policymakers are accustomed to understanding business regulation through
conceptual frameworks with conflict at their cores.2 Activism, in a classic framing,
1. E.g., ERIN BROKOVICH (Universal Pictures 2000); President Trump Eliminates
Job-Killing Regulations, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
articles/president-trump-eliminates-job-killing-regulations/.
2. See, e.g., JUDITH A. LAYZER, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: CONSERVATIVES'
OPPOSITION TO ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 333 (2012) (describing these adversarial
relationships).
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drives government regulation, and regulated businesses oppose or avoid that
regulation when they can and comply, often grudgingly, when opposition and
avoidance fail.3 Some studies have added nuance to this model, noting, for example,
that complying with regulations can help businesses with their branding and can
save money.4 Public choice theorists have identified other symbiotic but less
salutary relationships between regulation and business; they emphasize the tendency
of businesses to seek regulatory constraints upon their competitors.5 And private-
governance scholars have noted that some businesses have become sources as well
as objects of regulation.6 But the predominant conceptual model, which frames
multiple areas of theoretical inquiry, still treats the business sector as the nemesis of
government regulation.
This Article explores a different set of relationships between businesses
and regulation. It focuses on the multi-billion dollar environmental consulting
industry, which serves public and private entities seeking to comply with
environmental laws.7 For every major environmental regulatory program, there is a
corresponding set of engineers, scientists, planners, and other technically-trained
professionals who provide compliance services, often while employed by consulting
firms that contract with regulated entities. 8 To provide a few examples, these
consultants develop corporate environmental management strategies, investigate
land for potential contamination problems, and draft environmental impact studies
for proposed government projects. Regulation is their business; their ability to
secure fees depends upon the existence of business and governmental entities with
money to spend and regulatory challenges to navigate. Consultants pervade the
environmental field, and interacting with them is a core and recurring task for
regulators and regulated firms-as well as for attorneys.
9
3. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 59, 60 (1992) (describing successful activism and industry opposition);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 130-
31 (2013) (describing this traditional understanding).
4. See Michael E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, 264 Sci. AM. 168, 168
(1991) (arguing that regulation will reduce costs by spurring increased efficiency).
5. See Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1495, 1515-16 (1999) (warning of these dynamics and providing examples);
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model:
An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 508 (1988) ("[E]nvironmental
protection statutes ... often contain features consistent only with the protection of special
interests.").
6. E.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 141; Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts,
Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L.
1, 25-26 (2015).
7. For a general overview of the industry, see generally MARISA LIFSCHUTZ,
IBISWORLD INDUSTRY REPORT 54162: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING IN THE US (2018).
8. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
9. See Environmental Consultants, THE LAWYER'S BRIEF, Nov. 14, 2007, at 1
("The environmental laws and the potential liabilities under them have made the use of
environmental consultants a prerequisite to almost every environmentally related action.").
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This work makes environmental consultants integral to governance and
law. While consulting firms are private, they often engage in the sort of deliberative,
legally-inflected, and policy-oriented decision-making more traditionally associated
with governments. 0 They also participate in lawmaking. Environmental consultants
sometimes work directly with legislatures, but more often they work with
administrative agencies to craft statutes, regulations, and guidance documents.
11
They also define standards of practice within regulated fields, sometimes in ways
that gradually harden into legal obligations.12 In short, private consultants play
important roles not just in complying with, but also in shaping, public law. They
therefore hold potentially important lessons for the many fields of academic inquiry
that try to understand relationships between businesses and public regulation.
To seek those lessons, this Article examines two subfields of environmental
consulting. One is contaminated-site management in Massachusetts. Since 1992,
Massachusetts law has delegated authority over waste-site cleanups to the private
sector, with state regulators providing regulations, guidance, and selective audits of
private cleanups.13 Participants unabashedly refer to this system as "the privatized
model,"' 4 and, by design, it gives consultants a central role.'5 The other is
environmental impact analysis in California. 16 The California Environmental
Quality Act ("CEQA") 7 requires state and local government entities to assess, and
disclose the environmental consequences of, projects they will approve or carry out.
These entities also must invite and respond to public comments on those impacts.
The law thus reflects classic public law values; its basic goal is to facilitate informed,
transparent, and democratic public decision-making. 8 But the actual work of CEQA
compliance is partially privatized. By law, public entities must make final decisions
on projects, but private consultants typically take the lead on all the research,
writing, and deliberation that leads up to that final decision.19 For each industry, I
analyzed correspondence and advocacy materials produced by individual
consultants and by consulting industry organizations. I also interviewed consultants,
10. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part III.
12. Cal. Attorney Interview 3 (Oct. 9, 2017) (explaining how consultants'
methodologies evolved into accepted and then legally-demanded practices). For a full list of
interviews, see Appendix I.
13. See Miriam Seifter, Comment, Rent-a-Regulator: Design and Innovation in
Privatized Governmental Decisionmaking, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1091, 1103-04 (2006)
(describing and critiquing Massachusetts' program).
14. E.g., Guide: The Waste Site Cleanup Program, MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/guides/the-waste-site-cleanup-program (last visited May 2, 2018).
15. See infra notes 155-165 and accompanying text.
16. I have worked in both fields. From 1996 to 1999, I worked for an
environmental consulting firm in Massachusetts. From 2003 to 2007, I practiced
environmental law in California.
17. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21178.
18. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764
P.2d 278, 283 (Cal. 1988) ("The [environmental impact report] process protects not only the
environment but also informed self-government.").
19. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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environmental attorneys, representatives of client businesses and government
agencies, environmental group staff members, and regulators.
I found that in both realms, consultants relate to regulators, and to public-
law regimes more generally, in ways that often diverge from the adversarial
dynamics traditionally associated with private businesses. Two key roles emerged
(in addition to the primary task of delivering services to paying clients). In one role,
consultants strive to operate as trusted intermediaries between regulators and
regulated entities. In the other role, consultants act as practical environmentalists
who advocate for policies that are manageable for regulated businesses but that also
advance the underlying goals of public law. Consultants assume these roles partly
out of economic self-interest, but they also arise from a cultural affinity for
environmental protection. I do not claim that these findings are representative of the
entire environmental consulting industry; given the size of the industry, its
sensitivity to contextual factors, and its continuing evolution, it would be surprising
if such a claim were true. For similar reasons, the results do not necessarily
generalize to other private entities with incentives to promote public law.20 But these
findings do add new possibilities to older debates.
Most importantly, the study illustrates how private, professionalized, for-
profit actors can bolster a public-law regime. Most conventional theories would not
predict that outcome. Public choice theorists generally view interactions between
private businesses and public regulation with deep suspicion; they assume that in
those interactions, businesses will turn regulation to their own private ends. 21 Many
privatization theorists express similar fears; while, unlike public choice theorists,
they believe in the possibility of a public-spirited regulatory realm, they worry that
transferring tasks into private hands will disconnect regulation from what ought to
be its animating public values. 22 For many social-movement theorists, the key threat
is not so much privatization as it is institutionalization; they worry that as a
movement becomes more professionalized, it loses its vitality and force. 23 Under
any of these theories, the increasing importance of a professionalized industry that
sells compliance for a profit, and whose members unabashedly seek to serve their
paying clients, ought to be deeply concerning. Yet I found compelling evidence that
members of the industry are striving to improve the efficacy of environmental
regulation and to promote the values that inspire environmental law.
20. Nor do they necessarily generalize to other types of consultants. Compliance
consulting is a huge and growing business sector cutting across many industries, and there
likely are parallel dynamics in some other fields. But the work of political consultants, labor-
relations consultants, or corporate management consultants, to provide three examples, is
different from the environmental consulting work described here.
21. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
22. See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 4-6 (Martha
Minow & Jody Freeman eds., 2009) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT] (explaining
concerns).
23. See infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
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More generally, an inquiry into the environmental consulting industry
opens up new hypotheses for understanding how environmental regulation, and
regulation more generally, can succeed. This is no small issue, for one of the most
puzzling challenges of environmental law is figuring out why it often works.24 The
deck seems stacked against success. Environmental laws must emerge and then be
implemented in the face of focused, highly motivated, and well-funded opposition.
25
The informational demands of environmental regulation also can be enormous,
26
and regulators must contend with massive uncertainties. 27 Those regulators typically
work for government agencies, which politicians find easy to demonize and hard to
fund. 28 While regulatory efforts are often bolstered by nongovernmental activism,
that activism is often more than counterbalanced by aggressive industry lobbying
and litigation. 29 Given this array of challenges-many of which are not unique to
the environmental field-it is somewhat surprising that regulation ever succeeds.
And while sometimes it does not (anemic responses to climate change are a
particularly obvious example), there are many important measures by which both
corporate environmental performance and actual environmental quality have
improved dramatically since the advent of modern environmental law alongside
massive economic growth. This Article does not claim that the environmental
consulting industry alone explains that improvement, nor that environmental
consultants always work to bolster public-law regimes. But it does argue that if we
wish to understand how government regulation can actually thrive, looking solely at
government, regulated businesses, and nonprofit advocacy organizations will leave
24. See Doris A. Fuchs & Daniel A. Mazmanian, The Greening of Industry: Needs
of the Field, 7 Bus. STRATEGY & ENVI. 193, 193 (1998) (exploring reasons for an inadequate
understanding of the drivers of improved industry performance).
25. See Rena L. Steinzor, Toward Better Bubbles and Future Lives: A Progressive
Response to the Conservative Agenda for Reforming Environmental Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
11421, 11422-23 (2002) (describing the gauntlets of opposition that environmental rules must
navigate before becoming law).
26. See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental
Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619,
1623 (2004) (explaining environmental law's need for information, and how often that need
goes unfulfilled).
27. John S. Applegate & Robert L. Fischman, Foreword, Missing Information:
The Scientific Data Gap in Conservation and Chemical Regulation, 83 IND. L.J. 399, 399-
400 (2008).
28. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do
AND WHY THEY Do IT 235 (1989) ("No politician ever lost votes by denouncing the
bureaucracy.").
29. See Melissa Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution
of Regulatory Law, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 625, 666-67, 666 n.129 (2015) (describing and
compiling multiple sources documenting the relative infrequency of environmental groups'
claims).
30. See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS,
REGULATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2003) (noting that "almost all business corporations
in economically advanced democracies are significantly 'greener' than their predecessors
were a mere quarter century ago."); U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, THE BENEFITS
AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN Am ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 (2011) (finding massive benefits).
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us with an incomplete picture. Understanding the roles of private, for-profit actors
with interests in the success of regulatory regimes, and with values aligned with
those regimes, will also be a crucial part of the puzzle.
This Article's analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview
of the environmental consulting industry's evolution and current reach, and then
explains why it offers an intriguing case study for more general questions about
public choice theory, privatization, social movements, and the evolution of
environmental law. Part II briefly describes my research methodology. Part III
summarizes results, and Part IV explores their significance by returning to the
theoretical debates and explaining how the environmental consulting industry adds
to our understanding of business and public law.
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING INDUSTRY
Every day, many businesses navigate the complexities of environmental
law without retaining an environmental lawyer. Public-sector entities often manage
their environmental compliance needs in the same way. Much of these entities'
compliance work, and in some circumstances nearly all of it, is done by private
consultants working for for-profit companies.31 This Section provides a brief
overview of those consultants' industry. It then explains how that industry's
emergence implicates important legal-academic debates.
A. Emergence and Growth of the Industry
In the 1970s, in one of the most remarkable legislative outbursts in the
United States' history, Congress and state legislatures created much of the modern
field of environmental law. Within a few years, statutes regulating air quality,
3 2
water quality,33 endangered species protection,34 hazardous waste management,
35
and contaminated site cleanup 36 transformed the American legal system. 37 Those
statutes, and the regulations that soon followed, changed the work of American
lawyers. In 1960, the phrase "environmental lawyer" would have attracted quizzical
looks. 38 By the mid-1970s, a new legal discipline had emerged. Its practitioners
31. See LIFSCHUTZ, supra note 7, at 5-7.
32. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676-1713 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q)).
33. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387).
34. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544).
35. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Star. 2975 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987).
36. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Star. 2767 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657).
37. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67-97
(2004).
38. See id. at 47 (describing the 1969 event at which "[t]he term environmental
law appears to have been formally coined.").
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specialized in navigating or enforcing the complex requirements of the new
regulatory systems
9
.'
That same legislative outburst redefined other professional fields, and one
major consequence was the emergence of the environmental consulting industry.
The need for that industry flowed directly from the mandates of the new statutes.
40
Achieving clean air required engineers who understood how pollutants moved
through the atmosphere and how pollution control systems worked. 4 1 Protecting
biodiversity required biologists who understood animals and plants. 42 Managing
property transfers and contaminated waste site cleanups created the need for
engineers and scientists with expertise in the ways pollutants move through soil and
groundwater. 43 Planning land uses and transportation infrastructure required another
cadre of experts, including, as practices evolved, modelers capable of using complex
computer programs to understand and simulate urban systems.' The National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and its state-law counterparts, all of which
require detailed analyses of the consequences of government decisions, demanded
experts who could integrate all of these areas of expertise, and sometimes more, into
often-encyclopedic written studies, and who could interact with affected human
communities. 45 Those experts in turn needed support staff who could collect
samples, record field observations, and help write reports.46 Many companies and
government agencies hired in-house staff to handle some of these responsibilities.
47
But a huge share of the work went, and continues to go, to outside consulting firms
39. See Bernard Koteen, A Trail Guide to Careers in Environmental Law, HARv.
L. SCH. 4-6 (2013), https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2008/07/full-working-draft.pdf.
40. See Environmental Consultants, supra note 9, at 1.
41. James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts
Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
901, 909-10 (2005) (describing the Clean Air Act's emphasis on science-based decision-
making).
42. See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act:
Why Better Science Isn 't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1041-56 (1997).
43. See Patrick Del Duca, Management of Environmental Liabilities in Real Estate
Transactions, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10419, 10424-47 (2011).
44. See Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of
Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REv. 219, 260-64 (2013) (describing urban simulation
modeling).
45. See, e.g., Memorandum from Peter N. Brush, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Env't,
Safety, and Health, U.S. Dep't of Energy on Designating and Supporting NEPA Document
Managers to Secretarial Officers and Heads of Field Orgs., U.S. Dep't of Energy (Nov. 24,
1998), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/nepapub/nepa documents/RedDontlG-DOE-
nepa doc-managers.pdf (describing job responsibilities).
46. As an entry-level consultant, I spent most of my time doing fieldwork and
writing reports.
47. See Our Mission, NAEM, https://www.naem.org/our-community/mission
(last visited July 28, 2019) (explaining the role of in-house environmental health and safety
managers).
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specializing in environmental compliance.48 Consequently, for many college and
graduate students focusing on environmental science or engineering, environmental
consulting now offers both a viable entry-level job and a potential career.4 9
Unlike environmental legal practice, which was an unnamed and inchoate
discipline prior to the 1970s, the environmental consulting field was not entirely
new. For decades, engineers had been helping state and local governments with
wastewater treatment, and they had also pioneered initial efforts at other forms of
pollution control.5 Similarly, wildlife management was an old discipline,5 and the
idea of land use planning had been around for decades.52 But the emergence of new
laws transformed these fields. Name changes reflected a broader understanding of
the field; for example, over the course of the 1960s "sanitary engineering" became
"environmental engineering."53 And the emerging ecological focus of the laws also
brought a wave of scientists into fields that previously had been dominated by
engineers.54 Most importantly, the scale changed dramatically. The environmental
consulting field is now a multi-billion dollar, international industry.55 In an
interview, one experienced environmental lawyer succinctly captured its reach and
its integration with legal practice: "I can't even remember," she said, "when a
consultant wasn 't involved in a project that I'm working on."5 6
Beyond the scale and reach of the field, three other features of these
consultants' work are worth noting. First, much of that work resembles (and
sometimes competes with) legal practice: it involves reviewing governing statutes,
regulations, guidance, and court cases, and applying them to the facts at hand.5 7 For
48. See LIFSCHUTZ, supra note 7, at 5-7; ENVTL. ASSISTANCE Div., MICH. DEP'T
OF ENVTL. QUALITY, WORKING WITH AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANT 1-3 (2001)
(explaining what consultants do and when they are needed).
49. See Environmental Consulting Career Advice, PM ENVTL.,
https://www.pmenv.com/Environmental-Consulting-Career-Advice (last visited May 31,
2018).
50. See William C. Anderson, A History of Environmental Engineering in the
United States, in ENVTL. AND WATER RES. HISTORY SESS. OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF CIVIL ENG'G
CIVIL ENG'G CONF. AND EXPOsITION (2002),
https://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/40650%282003%291.
51. See Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How Scientific Disciplines
Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 495 (2012) (dating wildlife
management science to the 1930s).
52. See Edward J. Kaiser & David R. Godschalk, Twentieth Century Land Use
Planning: A Stalwart Family Tree, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASSoC. 365, 368 (1995).
53. Scoping Interview 7 (Sept. 1, 2017).
54. Experienced consultants also credited the shift toward environmental science
with bringing women into environmental consulting. In the 1970s, they told me engineering
was an almost exclusively male field. Scoping Interview 6 (July 21, 2017); Scoping Interview
7, supra note 53.
55. LIFSCHUTZ, supra note 7, at 5.
56. Cal. Attorney Interview 3, supra note 12.
57. Environmental lawyers often note the gradual shifting of work from lawyers
to consultants. See Dave Owen, Field Notes, ENVTL. L. PROF. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental-law/2013/11/field-notes.html. The growing
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example, a wetlands consultant would likely be familiar with the United States
Supreme Court's decision inRapanos v. United States,58 and would offer judgments,
based partly on legal texts and experience working with local regulators, about
whether a "significant nexus" exists between on-site wetlands and navigable-in-fact
waterways.59 Similarly, consultants preparing environmental impact studies must be
familiar with state and federal statutes, regulations, and case law governing
environmental review. 6 For large projects, they likely would do their quasi-legal
work on teams with environmental lawyers, but many smaller-scale projects now
proceed without environmental lawyers, and sometimes without any kind of lawyer,
and the client relies instead on the consultants' legal expertise.
61
Second, much of this consulting work involves types of decision-making
that one might initially perceive as classically governmental. In debates over public-
private boundaries, scholars often argue that decisions involving open-ended policy
choices with broad public consequences belong with government.62 Environmental
law's application often requires such policy-laden judgment calls; though
commentators lament the numbing specificity of environmental law, few
environmental regulatory programs function like recipe books. 63 Instead, for
example, someone must decide how many samples are sufficient to assess a large
site's soil and groundwater contamination-a decision that implicates basic value
questions about balancing health risk against compliance cost 64  or which
alternatives an environmental impact study should analyze. 65 Not all of those
decisions can be made under the close supervision of government regulators, and
instead many of them fall to the consultants.
importance of non-lawyers to legal work is not unique to this particular field. See John
Dzienkowski, The Future of BigLaw: Alternative Legal Service Providers to Corporate
Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 3000-01 (2014).
58. 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (determining the scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction
under the Clean Water Act).
59. See Donna Downing et al., Technical and Scientific Challenges in
Implementing Rapanos' "Water of the United States, " 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 42, 42
(2007); Leah Stetson, How to Hire the Right Wetlands Consultant, WETLAND NEws (Ass'n
of State Wetland Managers, Inc.) June-July 2007, https://www.aswm.org/pdf-lib/
consultant0607.pdf.
60. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 145, 180-82 and accompanying text.
62. See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282-83 (2017)
(summarizing this literature).
63. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 444 U.S. 1035, 1035 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari) (noting "[t]he fact that the
requirements of the Clea[n] Air Act Amendments virtually swim before one's eyes");
Jedediah Purdy, Coming into the Anthropocene, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1619, 1649 (2016)
(describing environmental law as "boring and alienating").
64. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON CHOOSING A SAMPLING DESIGN
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DATA COLLECTION FOR USE IN DEVELOPING A QUALITY ASSURANCE
PROJECT PLAN 27 (2002) (describing many judgment-based choices).
65. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (1972) (holding
that a "rule of reason" governs alternative selection).
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Third, consultants have a distinctive relationship with regulation. When
they work for industry, and sometimes when they work for government,
66
consultants often represent clients that view regulation as a source of inconvenience
and expense.67 A consultant often needs to show empathy for those frustrations.
68
At the same time, if regulatory requirements did not exist or were easy to understand
and fulfill, environmental consultants would not be hired. 69 Consultants also
understand that even if discovering environmental compliance problems will
frustrate clients, those discoveries can lead to additional consulting work.70 Of
course, many industries benefit from government regulation, but usually those
benefits arise from constraints upon competitors7 ' or because regulation ultimately
leads to safer or more efficient practices.72 An environmental consultant's
relationship with regulation is typically more direct: "Regulation-particularly
complex regulation-is the lifeblood of environmental consulting," as one
experienced consultant explained, and most participants in the field are aware of this
fact."
B. Theoretical Intersections
The environmental field is heavily studied, and one might think that
professional actors that are so important to that field would receive sustained
academic attention. But academic inquiry into environmental consulting has been
exceedingly limited.74 In practitioner-oriented legal publications, coverage is more
extensive, but that coverage generally focuses on issues like appropriate due
diligence when hiring a consultant or ways to structure consulting contracts to
66. When they manage land or infrastructure projects, government entities are
often the regulated rather than the regulators. Government officials who operate in these
capacities often share private industries' frustrations with environmental regulation.
67. I make this assertion based on my own experience working with clients.
68. I make this assertion based on my own experience working with clients.
69. See LIFSCHUTZ, supra note 7, at 7 (noting that regulation drives the
environmental consulting industry).
70. When I was a consultant, we sometimes joked that the main difference
between an audit report and a proposal was that we were paid to write the audit report.
71. See Biber, infra note 92, at 411 (noting that companies that compete with fossil
fuels have interests in regulation of greenhouse gas emissions).
72. See Porter, supra note 4, at 168. For a more recent review, see Stefan Ambec
et al., The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and
Competitiveness? 3 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, RFF DP 11-01, 2011),
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/Worklmages/Download/RFF-DP- 1-01 .pdf.
73. Scoping Interview 2 (Apr. 27, 2017); Mass. Consultant Interview 8 (Feb 1,
2018) ("[W]ithout a doubt, regulations do create work for us"); LIFSCHUTZ, supra note 7, at 9
("Introduction of stricter environmental regulation will be the primary driver of industry
growth.").
74. See Bernard Sinclair-Desgagn6, The Environmental Goods and Services
Industry, 2 INT'L REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 69, 69 (2008) (noting the rarity of
academic coverage of the environmental goods and services industry).
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minimize the discoverability of the consulting firm's reports." Absent from the
literature is any effort to grapple with deeper questions about what the emergence
of the consulting field actually means to environmental law, or to regulation more
generally.
Yet that emergence has implications for several recurring areas of
theoretical interest.7 6 First, the environmental consulting industry complicates
public-choice theorists' understanding of the relationships between private interest
groups and public regulation. Second, environmental consulting has direct relevance
to debates about the privatization, or "contracting-out," of governance, which has
become a central concern cutting across many policy areas. Third, the environmental
consulting industry holds potential lessons (though here the conclusions are more
tentative) for efforts to understand how the environmental movement, and social
movements more generally, can mature into sustained social change. All of these
debates relate to more sweeping questions about how functional regulatory
governance can actually occur. The discussion below summarizes each debate in
turn.
1. Public Choice
Public-choice theory, which first emerged from the work of economists in
the 1960s, 7 begins with the premise that legislators and bureaucrats are not altruists
who idealistically seek to right social wrongs, but instead rational actors seeking to
advance their own interest in accumulating and retaining power.7 They do this by
strategically responding to the needs of other powerful interests.7 9 And while
conventional democratic theory might have predicted that the most powerful interest
would be a majority of voters, public-choice theorists turned this assumption on its
head. Instead, they argued that, smaller, cohesive groups with focused interests were
likely to be the most powerful political players, for those groups would be much
more motivated and much better at coordinating their actions than a large, diffuse,
and often only-slightly-interested public. 0 These basic insights have since spawned
a huge volume of research.8 '
75. See, e.g., Environmental Consultants, supra note 9; Joel Schneider, The
Expanding Liability of Environmental Consultants to Third Parties, 13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 235,
260-61(2002).
76. An additional area of inquiry (which I address in a companion study) is the
emerging literature on regulatory intermediaries. See Dave Owen, Private Facilitators of
Public Regulation: A Study of the Environmental Consulting Industry, REGULATION &
GOVERNANCE (2019), https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12284; Kenneth W. Abbott et al.,
Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model, 670 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
POL. & Soc. ScI. 14, 15 (2017).
77. For a summary of these origins, see Macey, supra note 5, at 474-75.
78. Id. at 476-77.
79. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371-72 (1983).
80. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
81. See generally A RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010).
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These insights also have important implications for relationships between
businesses and environmental regulation.82 Businesses often form small, cohesive,
and well-endowed groups with high levels of interest in regulatory decision-making,
and therefore they are exactly the kinds of entities that public-choice theorists would
expect to enjoy outsized influence in regulatory policymaking.83 Consequently,
public-choice theory predicts that businesses will effectively thwart public
regulation or, even more problematically, that they will distort it to their own ends
by using it to squelch less powerful competitors.84 Public-choice theory, in other
words, predicts that businesses will disconnect government regulation from the
public-spirited values that otherwise might animate it.85
These insights have been enormously influential in the fields of
environmental law and regulatory theory generally, but theorists have drawn very
different lessons from similar premises.86 For some influential, early environmental
law theorists-most prominently, Joseph Sax-ideas reminiscent of (though not
explicitly tied to) public-choice theory explained why agencies could never be fully
trusted to serve the public interest, and why measures like citizen suits were
necessary counterweights to industry influence. 7 Most proponents of such
advocacy-based environmentalism were emphatically proregulation; they just
thought that elements of public-choice theory helped explain the need to reinforce
government regulation with additional public and judicial oversight.88 For others,
including many mainstream public-choice theorists, the prevalence of special-
interest influence instead supported a more libertarian critique of the very idea of
government regulation.8 9 If regulation is inevitably hijacked by powerful special
82. As Daniel Farber quipped, the most obvious implication for environmental
regulation is straightforward: "There should not be any." Yet, obviously, there is. Farber,
supra note 3, at 60.
83. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REV. 553, 565-66 (2001).
84. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL! DIRTY
AIR 59 (1981) (explaining how the coal industry in the eastern United States used the 1977
Clean Air Act Amendments to squelch competition from western coal producers).
85. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 562 (2000) (describing the mainstream public choice view that "[p]rivate groups
manipulate, pressure, bargain, and bribe to benefit themselves at the expense of others.").
86. Many theorists have also argued that public-trust dynamics can only partially
explain government behavior, and that public-spirited dynamics also occur. See, e.g.,
Christopher H. Schroeder, Public Choice and Environmental Policy, in A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, supra note 81, at 450.
87. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 560 (1969) ("[S]elf-interested and
powerful minorities often have an undue influence on the public resource decisions of
legislative and administrative bodies and cause those bodies to ignore broadly based public
interests. Thus, the function which the courts must perform, and have been performing, is to
promote equality of political power for a disorganized and diffuse majority.").
88. See JOSEPH L. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION, at xxi (1970) ("The administrative agency.., is an essential institution.").
89. See Jonathan Baert Weiner, On the Political Economy of Global
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEo. L.J. 749, 754-55 (1999) (summarizing these arguments).
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interests-groups that, according to many public-choice theorists, include
environmental activists as well as businesses90 -perhaps the best approach to
government regulation is to avoid having it at all.9 '
In some recent writing, a third offshoot of public-choice theory has begun
to emerge. 92 This view treats some level of public-choice dynamics as inevitable,
but unlike the early environmental law theorists or the libertarians, it does not treat
those dynamics as universally problematic. Instead, for example, Jonas Meckling
and his coauthors have argued that public-law regimes ought to be structured to build
up, and then be bolstered by, business entities whose interests align with the public-
spirited goals of the public-law regime. 93 Conequently, climate-law regimes should
be designed to promote renewable energy industries because once those industries
reach some critical mass, they will then become advocates for the survival and even
the expansion of the climate-law regime. 94 If public-choice dynamics are
unavoidable, the argument goes, they might as well be harnessed to serve the public
good.95
Meckling and his coauthors developed this argument in the specific context
of climate law, and they have framed it primarily as an explanation of recent trends
and a forward-looking strategy. 96 But renewable energy industries are not the only
private entities whose interests might align with public law goals, and some of those
entities, like environmental consultants, have been around for decades. 97 That raises
an intriguing possibility, which a close examination of the consulting field helps
explore: perhaps some version of this alternative form of public-choice dynamic has
been around for decades; and perhaps its existence has advanced the partial success
of environmental law.
90. See, e.g., Todd. J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L.
REv. 845, 848-49 (1999).
91. Freeman, supra note 85, at 562 ("[T]he problem, in this view, is public
power.").
92. Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 SCIENCE
1170, 1170 (2015); Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate
Change Policy from the Defeat of California's Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 399, 449-
53 (2013).
93. Meckling et al., supra note 92, at 1170.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. E.g., Biber, supra note 92, at 402 (drawing lessons from a 2010 California
ballot initiative for future climate policy).
97. The insurance industry is a particularly interesting example of this potential
alignment. See, e.g., Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How
Insurance Companies Act as "Compliance Managers"for Businesses, 43 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
417, 420-22 (2018) (explaining how the industry works to reduce data breaches).
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2. Privatization
In recent decades, another major concern of the administrative law field
has been the privatization of governmental functions. 98 Scholars have noted that in
many realms, a traditional binary distinction between governmental and private
functions no longer holds much descriptive force. 99 Instead, many traditionally
governmental functions, ranging from military operations and prison administration
to managing national park concessions, now are handled by private contractors. 100
These privatization trends have spawned vigorous debates about whether, and under
what circumstances, these changes are desirable and how law should manage the
resulting public-private hybrids.' 0 '
At a general level, the resulting literature has coalesced around two primary
views.'0 2 One is that privatization offers major performance benefits. 103 According
to this view, private contractors bring more nimbleness and talent to many tasks. 104
Because they may perform similar tasks for multiple governmental units, private
contractors also offer greater specialized expertise. 105 Proponents of this positive
view of privatization rarely argue that everything about governance should be
privatized. Instead, they would often reserve tasks that require broad-ranging policy
judgments to the public sphere.'0 6 But they do argue that many traditional
government tasks could be handled more effectively by private companies. 107
98. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (2003).
99. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1369 (2003); Freeman, supra note 85, at 547.
100. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DuKE L.J.
437, 439-40 (2005); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 989
(2005); Concessions, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/subjects/concessions/
index.htm (last visited June 5, 2018).
101. See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 22 (providing multiple
perspectives on these debates).
102. There are scholars-most prominently, Jody Freeman, whose papers are cited
throughout this article-whose work does not fit neatly into this dichotomy.
103. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Jacobucci, Privatization and
Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1429-30 (2003) (asserting several advantages for
private action).
104. See Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context: What
Drives it, How to Improve it, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 22, at 209-10, 212-
13 (arguing that outsourcing gives government access to better technology, more talented
workers, and greater flexibility).
105. See John D. Donohue, The Transformation of Government Work: Causes,
Consequences, and Distortions, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 22, at 41, 44.
106. See Welton, supra note 62, at 282-83 (summarizing multiple sources sharing
this view).
107. See Soloway & Chvotkin, supra note 104, at 192 (identifying outsourcing as
"essential to help government achieve its mission.").
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Many other commentators worry that privatization can erode public
values. 08 In part, these worries trace directly to legal doctrine; privatization's critics
warn that contractors are often not subject to statutory laws, like the Administrative
Procedure Act, 10 9 that are designed to ensure transparent and deliberative
governance, and are similarly exempt from constitutional due-process
requirements." 0 But while these doctrinal effects are important, the concerns run
even deeper. Critics also worry that the private sector, with its central focus on profit,
will seek to turn legal compliance into a marketable commodity, often at the expense
of the basic values underlying public law. "' Indeed, in the most jarring accounts of
privatization, this escape from public-law values and accountability is not just a
consequence but a central policy goal." 2 As Jon Michaels has explained,
privatization can sometimes be a method for surreptitiously expanding executive
power, as government officials use private contractors to shield questionable
initiatives from public oversight. "'
Some of the studies bolstering these concerns have involved specialized
professionals, and sometimes even consultants. For example, in a classic study of
workplace discrimination response procedures, Lauren Edelman and her coauthors
found that compliance professionals had convinced employers and judges that a
grievance policy was the key component of a program to prevent sexual
harassment. 1"' This position initially had little basis, legal or otherwise; Edelman
and her coauthors found scant evidence that these programs had traditionally
bolstered legal defenses or effectively addressed discrimination. " But over time,
private professionals convinced employers to emphasize these programs, and then
they convinced courts to accept the existence of these programs as a key element of
a legal defense. 1 16 From these findings, Edelman and her coauthors drew the
disturbing conclusion that private organizations are constructing the concept of legal
compliance in ways primarily designed to serve management's needs. "'
A similar example-and a rare example involving environmental
consultants-emerges from the field of stream restoration. There, a consultant
named Dave Rosgen was remarkably effective at convincing regulators that his
108. E.g., Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 22, at 128 (arguing that the language of privatization
excludes important value questions).
109. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706.
110. See Metzger, supra note 99, at 1413-21 (describing gaps in state action
doctrine); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New
Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1703 (2002).
111. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 98, at 1234.
112. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 717
(2010).
113. Id.
114. Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance
Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406, 406-08 (1999). Edelman et al.'s study
does not discuss whether the professionals were in-house staff or external consultants.
115. See id. at 407-09, 445-49.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 445-46.
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method for restoring impaired streams should become the regulatory standard,
despite widespread concerns from scientists that the efficacy of his restoration
methods was at best undemonstrated." 8 As geographer Rebecca Lave explains,
"Consulting firms and state and federal resource and regulatory agencies throughout
the United States are now staffed by people who associate stream restoration with
Rosgen," an outcome that appears to be both a product and a driver of the heavy
enrollment in his river restoration courses." 9 Like the accounts of workplace
discrimination compliance, this example illustrates the concern that private actors,
including consultants, will simply commodify legal compliance, turning it into
something that is easy to buy and sell rather than something that advances the
underlying values of the relevant public laws.
3. Social Movements
Another area of theoretical interest involves the ways in which a social
movement like environmentalism can turn into lasting and effective governance. For
years, this has been a central concern of environmentalists, and of students of social
movements more generally. 20 Environmentalism, like most social movements,
enjoyed an initial groundswell of popular support, which quickly crystallized into a
variety of federal, state, and local environmental laws. 121 But the maturation of the
movement has not been easy. After a fairly brief period of consensus both within
and outside the movement, environmentalism has been riven with internal dissent
and beset by active, and often effective, opposition. 122 The election of Donald Trump
was just the latest in a long series of blows, and it intensified questions about the
movement's ability to sustain its past gains and to achieve new ones. 123
The debates about the environmental movement, and about social
movements more generally, are multifaceted, but one key facet involves the
professionalization of the movement. Without question, environmentalism has been
institutionalized; what started as a somewhat rag-tag collection of amateur-yet
successful-activists has matured into a professionalized field filled with highly
118. REBECCA LAVE, FIELDS AND STREAMS: STREAM RESTORATION,
NEOLIBERALISM, AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 14 (2012).
119. Rebecca Lave, Bridging Political Ecology and STS: A Field Analysis of the
Rosgen Wars, 102 ANNALS Assoc. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 366, 371 (2012). While Rosgen's
methodology has received widespread criticism, see id., Lave's account suggests that Rosgen
himself does believe in its efficacy.
120. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese. Social Movements, Law, and Society: The
Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 85, 94-99 (2001).
121. See LAZARUS, supra note 37, at 67-84 (describing the movement's early
legislative successes).
122. See id. at 94-97 (describing the early evolution of counterattacks); Purdy,
supra note 63, at 1633 (noting internal dissent about whether the movement "has lost its fire
and imagination").
123. See Marianne Lavelle, In Trump's World, Environmental Movement Wrestles
With Its Future, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 14, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/14112016/donald-trump-environment-climate-change-paris-agreement-keystone-xl.
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trained scientists and lawyers. 124 Some environmental advocates and scholars worry
that this change has divorced environmentalism from the grassroots energy that once
gave the movement its strength. 125 Others contest this view and argue that the current
struggles of the movement have less to do with calcified institutionalization and
more to do with the challenges faced by any movement that must do sustained battle
with powerful and entrenched economic actors. 126 Few would dispute, however, that
the shift is important.
Intertwined with the institutionalization debate is a debate about the
appropriate relationship between environmentalism and private industry. Early in
the environmental movement, that relationship was primarily adversarial; industry
was a villain and a foil-and an obligingly bumbling one at that127-rather than a
potential partner.128 But as regulated industries mounted increasingly successful
counterattacks against environmental regulation, 129 environmentalists began
debating whether their movement should work more closely with powerful
industries, or whether that closer relationship would compromise the movement's
values and popular appeal. 30 Those discussions continue to the present day.'
These debates have never focused upon the environmental consulting
industry. In the institutionalization debates, the primary foci instead have been
124. Coglianese, supra note 120, at 116.
125. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, Environmentalism Was Once a Social-Justice
Movement. It Can Be Again, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2016/12/how-the-environmental-movement-can-recover-its-soul/50983 1/ (noting
critiques of "a movement of professionals and experts: lawyers, economists, and ecologists
who have limited interaction with, and do relatively little to empower, the people who live
with the most severe environmental problems"); PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE:
THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 252 (rev. ed. 2003) (describing critiques of
overly professionalized environmentalists).
126. For a sampling of these arguments, as well as claims that critics have
underestimated the creativity of the environmental movement, see Oliver A. Houck, Rumors
of My Demise... A Review of Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the
Politics of Possibility, 38 ENVTL. L. 627, 634 (2008).
127. See Jill Lepore, The Right Way to Remember Rachel Carson, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/26/the-right-way-to-
remember-rachel-carson (describing the chemical industry's tone-deaf response to Silent
Spring).
128. See Paul Sabin, Environmental Law and the End of the New Deal Order, 33
LAW & HIST. REV. 965, 972 (2015) (describing early environmentalists' distrust of
government and business).
129. For discussion of the evolution of these attacks, see Daniel A. Farber, The
Conservative as Environmentalist: From Goldwater to Reagan to the 21st Century, 59 ARIz.
L. REV. 1005, 1024-41 (2017).
130. See, e.g., Fred Krupp, The Making of a Market-Minded Environmentalist,
STRATEGY+BUSINESS (June 10, 2008), http://www.strategy-business.com/article/-
08201 (describing the Environmental Defense Fund's turn toward closer collaboration with
business and some of the adverse reactions from other environmental groups).
131. See, e.g., Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me, I'm a Pragmatist: A Partially
Pragmatic Critique of Pragmatic Activism, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 425, 453-56 (2017)
(describing and critiquing accommodationist approaches to environmental activism).
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environmental advocacy organizations, and debaters have contested whether those
organizations' staffing models and advocacy tactics reflected excessive or
insufficient institutionalization. 132 Similarly, the literature on social movements and
business has focused on activists' engagement with regulated industries, not on the
consultants who assist those industries with their compliance.'33 Yet the consulting
industry, even more than the shifting staffing of non-profits like the Sierra Club,
represents the apotheosis of institutionalized environmentalism; it turns
environmental work not just into a paid job, but a paid job within a for-profit
company. And as this Article will show, a study of the consulting industry shows
that institutionalization, though it obviously carries threats, can work in surprisingly
salutary ways.
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This Article explores the environmental consulting industry by focusing on
two subfields. The first is contaminated site management 3 4 in Massachusetts. The
second is environmental impact assessment consulting in California. 135
For each of these areas, I used two primary research techniques, both of
them qualitative. I researched documents created by consultants--either
individually or through trade associations-when those consultants sought to
advocate for, or just inform, public policy-making. In contrast to documents
prepared for clients, these public-advocacy documents signal the policy priorities
and cultural orientation of the field. 136 Second, I interviewed consultants, attorneys,
regulators, clients, and employees of environmental advocacy organizations.
Interviews were semi-structured, and questions focused on ways in which
consultants influence the development of law and on cultural differences (and
similarities) between consultants, private attorneys, clients, and regulators.'37
132. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots
Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687, 689 (1995)
(critiquing mainstream environmental groups for failing to empower grassroots activists).
133. See, e.g., ThERMS FOR ENDEARMENT: BUSINESS, NGOs, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (Jem Bendell ed. 2017); Brayden C. King, A Political Mediation Model of
Corporate Response to Social Movement Activism, 53 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 395,409 (2008); Jamie
R. Hendry, Taking Aim at Business: What Factors Lead Environmental Non-Governmental
Organizations to Target Particular Firms?, 45 Bus. & Soc'y 47, 49-50 (2006).
134. I use the term "management" rather than "cleanup" because many mildly
contaminated sites are not actively remediated.
135. I used Massachusetts waste-site management and California environmental
impact assessments consulting partly for geographic and subject-matter diversity and partly
because my professional background familiarized me with each type of work.
136. These signals aren't perfect. Some self-selection occurs when consultants
decide to become active in an industry organization, and any such organization will have
different interests than the industries it claims to represent.
137. For both sets of interviews, I drew on my own professional connections to
generate initial lists of interview subjects and then used snowball surveying (which means
asking interview subjects for recommendations for other subjects while also trying to obtain
a range of backgrounds and geographic locations). For the Massachusetts interviews, I also
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Consultant Private Govt. Client Envtl. or Total
Firm Pub.
Attorney Health
138 Advocate
Scoping/
bkgrd. 5 3 0 0 0 8
Mass.
10 4 5 2 3 24
Cal. envtl.
11 8 3 2 2 26
Total 26 15 8 4 5 58
Table 1: Number of interview subjects by category139
This methodology cannot support definitive conclusions about the entire
environmental consulting field. The field is heterogeneous, and practices in two
specific sub-areas (both in politically liberal states) likely differ from practices in
other states or countries. 40 Indeed, because the field lacks core defining traits-
unlike lawyers, all of whom must attend law school, take the bar exam, and earn a
legal license, environmental consultants face no universal educational or entrance
requirements 14 ' and come from a wide variety of backgrounds-it is somewhat
contacted a randomized sample of Licensed Site Professionals. I promised anonymity to all
of my interviewees.
138. Some of the private-firm attorneys primarily represent developers, some
primarily represent environmental or community groups, some focus on government agency
work, and some represent multiple client types.
139. In addition to these interviews, which focused on the California and
Massachusetts programs, I also conducted a series of interviews (some as background and
some on the record) to refine my research focus and learn more about the history of the
environmental consulting field. Additionally, some interview subjects had occupied more
than one of these roles over the course of their careers. In this table, I have listed those subjects
in the category upon which my interview questions primarily focused.
140. See LIFSCHUTZ, supra note 7, at 23 (describing the range of markets in which
the industry operates and services it offers as well as trends toward consolidation). Interview
subjects often drew contrasts between CEQA consulting and other areas of work in California
and between waste site cleanup regulation in Massachusetts and analogous programs in other
states. See, e.g., Cal. Attorney Interview 2 (Oct. 6, 2017) (asserting that consultants "are more
involved in the CEQA process.., than just about anything else.").
141. Many consultants have passed professional qualifying exams and have
professional certifications; the field has many professional engineers, professional geologists,
and certified planners. But in contrast to lawyers, these examinations are not barriers to field
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unclear where the boundaries of the field even are. The field is also evolving, as are
the legal and business realms in which it operates, and today's truths may not last. 1
42
Nevertheless, this inquiry does demonstrate distinctive roles that consultants-and
perhaps, other private entities-at least sometimes play, and even caveated
conclusions about those roles can expand our understanding of regulatory
governance and environmental law.
III. RESULTS
This Part explores several key ways in which consultants strive to affect
the implementation of environmental law. To provide context, it begins with an
overview of waste-site cleanup regulation in Massachusetts and of environmental
impact analysis in California. It then describes two overlapping roles143 -beyond
the obvious role of delivering compliance services, for a fee, to clients-that
consultants play in those fields. The first of these roles is trusted intermediary. In
this role, the consultant cultivates a reputation as a trustworthy mediator between
clients and regulators, generally by trying to provide accurate information and work
within, rather than against, the boundaries of the regulatory program. The second
role is practical environmentalist. In this latter role, the consultant does more than
merely serve as a client agent, and instead tries to work-typically in quiet ways-
to strengthen environmental protection.
A. The Programs
1. Waste-Site Cleanup in Massachusetts
In the late 1980s, after a series of scandals brought hazardous waste sites
to national attention, 14 waste-site investigation and cleanup became central
concerns of environmental law. 14' The largest cleanups were often handled under
the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act. 146 But across the nation, there were, and still are, many more contaminated sites
that remained subject to state oversight. 14 Massachusetts was no exception.
Thousands of contaminated sites were discovered, and most of them remained under
entry (often the exam is taken as a career-advancement step after several years of professional
work), and there is no single standardized certification.
142. See LIFSCHUTZ, supra note 7, at 23 (describing industry consolidation).
143. For purposes of exposition, I have described these roles separately; but in
practice the distinctions are blurry. A consultant might note, for example, that playing the role
of neutral facilitator is a way to strengthen environmental law, just as a judge or neutral
mediator arguably strengthens the legal system by serving as a neutral arbiter of disputes.
144. See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 45 (1995) (describing the
consequences of environmental contamination in Woburn, Massachusetts).
145. See LSP Association, LSPA Suspending Disbelief, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2013),
https://youtu.be/gE8EzSbLQol.
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
147. See Revesz, supra note 83, at 595-97 (providing statistics on federal and state
cleanup programs).
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the oversight of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
("Massachusetts DEP"). 148
In the 1980s, Massachusetts developed a regulator-centered program to
address investigation and cleanup of these sites. 149 At multiple stages of the process,
site owners needed to obtain regulators' approvals of their reports and plans. 50 By
the late 1980s, many people (within and outside the Massachusetts DEP) thought
this system was failing.' 5 ' Of the thousands of sites in the system, hardly any had
been cleaned up, partly because owners were waiting for backlogged and cautious
regulators to provide approvals.'52 That slow pace created real costs, and not just for
regulated entities and their lenders.'53 Communities were frustrated with the
persistence of contamination and the associated loss of developable land, and
environmental advocates, not just in Massachusetts but across the country, worried
that failures to redevelop contaminated urban properties were actually contributing
to urban sprawl. 1
5 4
Massachusetts responded to these challenges by convening a working
group composed of regulators, private- and public-sector attorneys, lenders,
environmentalists, and environmental consultants. 1"' The group created an
innovative proposal, which the Massachusetts Legislature soon enacted into law:
regulatory oversight should be partially privatized. 156 Massachusetts DEP retained
important roles: the agency drafted and periodically updates detailed implementing
148. See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., EXEC. OFFICE OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF
ENVTL. PROT., INTERIM REPORT: WASTE SITE CLEANUP PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS AND
FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS 78-79 (1990) [hereinafter 21E COMMITTEE REPORT] (providing
statistics on site status).
149. See MASS. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., THE MASSACHUSETTS WASTE SITE
CLEANUP PROGRAM, APPENDICES: MEASURES OF PROGRAM PERFORMANCE 1993-2001 A-I TO
A-2, https://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/stakeholders/20070629massapp.pdf (last visited July 29,
2019) (describing the pre-1993 program).
150. Id.
151. See id. at 1-2; Mass. Regulator Interview 2 ("[I]t created an architecture that
was extraordinarily difficult for the agency, frankly, to implement and for the private sector
to deal with.").
152. See id. at 78-79; Seifter, supra note 13, at 1102-03.
153. Mass. Regulator Interview 3 (May 5, 2017) ("[I]t was becoming quite a
disaster.").
154. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of
Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 883, 895-96 (describing
economic and environmental problems created by abandonment of brownfields). Because
these concerns align environmental protection with development, brownfield redevelopment
has never been a particularly partisan issue. See, e.g., Remarks by President George W. Bush,
In the Signing of HR 2869, The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, Jan. 11, 2002, 2002 WL 27811 ("[O]ne of the best ways to arrest
urban sprawl is to develop brownfields, and make them productive pieces of land, where
people can find work and employment.").
155. 21E COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 148, at 78-79; LSP Association, supra
note 145.
156. See id. The proposal was codified as an update to Massachusetts General Law
Chapter 21E.
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regulations; 15 7 and it audits some sites for compliance with regulatory standards.15
8
But primary responsibility for studying contaminated sites, deciding cleanup goals,
selecting remediation methods, and determining when a site is sufficiently clean lies
with "Licensed Site Professionals," or "LSPs."' 159 To this day, participants in the
Massachusetts program routinely refer to it as "the privatized model."16
0
As a practical matter, the reliance on LSPs meant reliance on
environmental consultants. There are now over 400 actively licensed LSPs, and
while some work directly for private property managers or for government agencies,
most are consultants. 16' The Board of Registration of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup
Professionals, which administers a licensing exam, 162 reviews applications to
become LSPs, and also handles discipline against existing LSPs, is composed
primarily of practicing consultants. 163 Consultants also play central roles in the
Licensed Site Professional Association ("LSPA"), a private nonprofit organization
that supports and represents LSPs.164 These consultants do not operate in a vacuum:
they must answer to their clients and to regulators, they often work with lawyers,
and lending institutions and potential property buyers also take a close interest in
their work. 165 But consultants are the core participants in an important regulatory
program.
157. 310 MASS. CODE REGS. § 40.0000. Practitioners refer to these regulations as
the "Massachusetts Contingency Plan," or "MCP."
158. See Guide: Waste Site Cleanup Audit Program, MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/guides/waste-site-cleanup-audit-program (last visited June 6, 2018).
159. Seifter, supra note 13, at 1104-12. Even in states that do not use this model,
and on federal cleanups, consultants do much of the fieldwork and report writing. The
Massachusetts program differs from the traditional model by giving consultants more
decision-making autonomy.
160. E.g., Guide: The Waste Site Cleanup Program, supra note 14.
161. As of May 15, 2018, the exact number of actively licensed LSPs was 420. See
Search for Waste Site Cleanup Professionals, ENERGY & ENVTL. AFF. DATA PORTAL,
https://eeaonline.eea.state.ma.us/portal#!/search/lsp (last visited May 15, 2018).
162. While LSPs must pass this exam, consultants who work in support of LSPs, or
consultants who work in other environmental consulting fields in Massachusetts, do not need
to take the exam. For that reason, LSPs are a subset of consultants, and many of the
consultants at the firm where I worked were not LSPs.
163. Biographies of Licensed Site Professional Board Members, MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/biographies-of-licensed-site-professional-board-
members (last visited June 1, 2018).
164. See LSP Association Leadership, LSP ASS'N, http://www.lspa.org/lspa-
leadership (last visited June 1, 2018).
165. Mass. Consultant Interview 4 (Jan. 31, 2018) ("I'm sometimes surprised that
my private real estate developers don't always have lawyers involved and rely on me.").
When LSPs do work with lawyers, the roles sometimes blur. As one LSP explained, "it's a
pretty cooperative venture here. Most of the attorneys we work with... they know us and we
know them and the LSPs practice a little law and the lawyers practice a little LSP." Mass.
Consultant Interview 1 (Nov. 30, 2017).
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To this day, and as the discussion below will explain in more detail,
participants praise that program. 166 Without any exceptions, my interview subjects
described the program as a success; and consultants, attorneys, and government
regulators offered consistent accounts of the reasons for success. 167 They explained
the program had greatly accelerated the pace of cleanups, so that hundreds of
properties had been studied, remediated if necessary, removed from the regulatory
program, and made available for commercial use. 1
68
2. Environmental Impact Consulting in California
Like its more famous federal counterpart, the National Environmental
Policy Act, CEQA is an environmental assessment statute. 169 It requires state and
local agencies to disclose and seek public comment on the significant environmental
impacts of projects they would approve or carry out, along with alternatives to those
projects and ways to mitigate their impacts. 170 Unlike NEPA, which famously lacks
a substantive mandate,' 7 ' CEQA also requires state agencies to avoid or mitigate
significant adverse environmental impacts, to the extent that it is feasible to do so. 1
72
Because of the statute's reach, and because of a long tradition of demanding judicial
oversight, CEQA now dominates environmental practice in California. 173
166. See R. Duff Collins, Woodard & Curran Inc., The Massachusetts LSP
Program: 17 Years of Innovation (2010) (on file with author) (providing multiple slides with
statistics). For a contrasting view, see Seifter, supra note 13, at 1098. Seifter reviewed audit
reports and concluded that "LSPs routinely permit-or execute-deviations from state
regulations governing hazardous waste site cleanups, sometimes creating serious risks to
human health and the environment." Id. at 1098. She therefore concludes that the program
"fails on its own terms." Id. Despite that conclusion, her comment remains agnostic about
whether the program's other benefits outweigh these problems. See id. at 1098-99. In
interviews, I often asked about disagreements between regulators and the regulated, and
sometimes specifically mentioned Seifter's findings. Interview subjects, including regulators,
consultants, and regulated entities, explained that the disagreements typically focused on the
extent of needed site characterization; and that the differences were explained in large part by
the demanding standards established by Massachusetts DEP. They never described the
program as a failure.
167. I did hear concerns about whether major staffing cuts at Massachusetts DEP
will allow the program to sustain its success. Mass. Advocate Interview 2 (May 15, 2019).
168. Following Massachusetts' lead, several other states have created similar
programs. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Legislative Innovation in State Brownfields
Redevelopment Programs, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 47-63 (2001).
169. See Cleveland Nat'l Forest Found. v. San Diego Ass'n of Gov'ts, 397 P.3d
989, 992 (Cal. 2017) (noting that CEQA "requires that public agencies assess the
environmental impacts of projects requiring government permits.").
170. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.
171. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens' Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
("[I]t is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process.").
172. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081(a)(1); City of Marina v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal.
State Univ., 138 P.3d 692, 697 (Cal. 2006) (explaining this obligation).
173. See Antonio Rossmann, The 25-Year Legacy of Friends of Mammoth, 21
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 63, 66 (1998) ("[T]he law was interpreted early and
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CEQA has been a boon for the environmental consulting industry.
Consultants prepare the vast majority of environmental impact reports and other
CEQA studies, and a typical team for a large development project would likely
include consultants with expertise in wetlands delineation, endangered species
protection, land use planning, traffic and air quality modeling, water supply analysis,
archaeology, and public outreach, among other disciplines.174 Some members of the
team would integrate the work of all of these disciplines into a larger report. 175 To
an outsider, the degree of specialization can seem remarkable. For example, there
are consultants who specialize in fields as narrow as urban wind tunnel effects and
marine archaeology. 1
76
Like LSPs in Massachusetts, these CEQA consultants blur public and
private boundaries. When private CEQA consultants work for public agencies, 177
forcefully by the highest Court in the jurisdiction, which in turn was supported by the
Legislature's refinements and essential ratification.").
174. E.g., Cal. Attorney Interview 3, supra note 12 (noting that for a renewable
energy project, "[T]he consultant team typically includes biologists and air quality and
greenhouse gas ... somebody on traffic, somebody on soils. And that is about as light as it
gets."). For greenfield projects, the attorney added, "Now you're talking about a cast of a
dozen consultants, each of whom occupies a narrow space, but very, very deeply." Id.
175. Cal. Consultant Interview 1 (Sept. 29, 2017) (describing this role).
176. Cal. Attorney Interview 3, supra note 12 (describing different varieties of
consultants); see CAL. HIGH SPEED RAIL AUTH., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
REPORT/STATEMENT: MERCED TO FRESNO 9-1 to 9-9 (2011), http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/
programs/merced-fresno-eir/drftEIRMerFresVoll_9.pdf (listing 97 consultants involved
in document preparation).
177. Consultants work for both private developers pursuing projects and for public
entities reviewing the projects (though usually not at the same time). One attorney
summarized the payment arrangements for government representation:
[I] n California, there's a range of practices, all of which are perfectly legal,
one of which is on the far end of the scale. The applicant supplies the
administrative draft [environmental impact report], having chosen its own
consultant, (and) gives it to the public agency. That agency has to review
it and ultimately has to be comfortable with it and cannot issue a formal
draft EIR until it reflects the independent judgment of the agency. And
that's more common in southern California. The other end of the
continuum is the culture at the lead agency is that developers are generally
not trusted, and they get no input on the consultant and are told, "just write
the check." The contractual relationship will be between the agency and
the consultant and the agency chooses its own.
Cal. Attorney Interview 10 (Nov. 9, 2017). Another attorney who represents developers noted
that developers' attorneys still try to influence the work product:
[The consultants] try to stay neutral. But the fact is ... the projects I'm
working on, they're in it from $500,000 to north of $1 million in fees. So
I consciously develop those relationships because if I send them a freaking
project, I want to them to know where it came from. I want them to know
how good I expect the work to be. And if they don't, they're never going
to see another referral. So I have a lever at least to get them to do a good,
professional job.
Cal. Attorney Interview 5 (Nov. 6, 2017).
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they complete tasks one might think of as classically governmental.' 78 CEQA, like
NEPA, is an idealistic statute grounded in a faith in agency deliberation and public
dialogue. Its core premise is that if agencies studiously consider their proposed
actions, and seek and respond to public input on those actions, better governmental
decision-making will result.'79 Yet in practice, it is often the private consultants who
help define the range of alternatives that will be considered, facilitate public
meetings, write responses to public comments, help the agency choose its path
forward, and assess whether that path complies with governing law. 180
As that last sentence suggests, CEQA consultants' work often resembles
legal practice. Consultants consider an understanding of the statute, its
implementing regulations and guidance documents, and recent court decisions to be
essential to their work.' 8 ' They also often explain law to clients and sometimes to
lawyers. In addition to declining to hire their own CEQA counsel, or waiting to do
so until litigation is imminent, some government agencies maintain firewalls
between their CEQA consultants and the project proponent's attorneys, and the
consultant interacts with a generalist city or county attorney. 182 Consequently, at key
decision-making points, the consultant is often the leading environmental law expert
in the room.'83 As one consultant put it, "it's actually fairly rare that cities and
counties have highly experienced CEQA in-house counsel.., we often feel like
178. See Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT, supra note 22, at 178 (identifying a contract solicitation for environmental
planning and public outreach as the mostly likely, among a pool of 200 solicitations, to be
"problematic").
179. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d
278, 282-83 (Cal. 1988) (explaining CEQA's purposes).
180. E.g., Cal. Consultant Interview 7 (Oct. 24, 2017) ("1 get involved very much,
also, on the public end of things. I will lead public meetings and workshops."); Cal.
Consultant Interview 5 (Oct. 13, 2017). The latter consultant added:
Oh, yeah, we're very hands on with that stuff. I mean, usually for
alternatives, for example, we will set up a day where we go somewhere
and we sit and we brainstorm alternatives with maybe five people on our
team, depending on which disciplines are most important... I don't think
I've ever worked on a project where the agency handed us that stuff. They
really look to us to give them suggestions, give them ideas and defend it.
181. Cal. Consultant Interview 8 (Nov. 8, 2017) (describing how the consultant
might use his knowledge of a recent case to advise a client); Cal. Consultant Interview 3 (Oct.
9, 2017) ("1 don't think anyone should be doing environmental consulting work who hasn't
read and re-read the procedural provisions of the regulations."); see also id. ("I am literally
advising both public- and private-sector clients about how to produce the most defensible...
administrative record.., that's likely to withstand litigation.").
182. Cal. Consultant Interview 1, supra note 175 ("Some cities actually have a
firewall .... We're not contacting the developer even though we're invoicing them.").
183. Cal. Attorney Interview 5, supra note 177 ("1 can't think of any
[environmental impact report] process I've gone through where the consultant isn't giving
any direct advice to the client at some point, if not primarily. And then it's really a peer review
by the lawyer.").
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we're kind of pseudo-lawyers in the level of knowledge that we try to provide to our
clients." 114
B. The Roles of Consultants
Within each of these programs, consultants play a variety of roles. Most
obviously, they deliver, for a price, information and documents that their clients use
to show compliance with governing laws. But more subtly, consultants help shape
the programs themselves, and thus help determine how environmental law will
function in practice. The Sections below explain two of those roles and then describe
specific episodes in which both roles were in play.
1. The Consultant as Trusted Intermediary
The core work of an environmental consultant is to deliver compliance
services to paying clients. In practice, delivering those services often involves
working with regulators. The consultants with whom I spoke repeatedly emphasized
ways in which collaborative, trust-grounded relationships with regulators enabled
them to perform client services more effectively. Sometimes the client services were
specific to individual projects, and sometimes they involved providing more general
feedback on challenges that clients faced, often in the context of a rulemaking or
guidance update. But in both roles, consultants and regulators alike emphasized the
consultants' roles as trusted intermediaries between regulated entities and their
regulators.
One key element of that role is frequent communication about regulatory
programs. Some of that discussion is just ongoing, informal dialogue; as one
Massachusetts LSP noted, "we have our ongoing skirmishes, but by and large, DEP
is pretty open with consultants ... It's easy to talk to DEP people."' 85 Consultants
also routinely communicate on specific regulatory initiatives. 186 For example, in
Massachusetts consultants comment on most DEP-proposed regulations and
guidance; recent subjects include modeling or measuring the intrusion of toxic
vapors into buildings,' 87 treatment options for contaminants floating on top of
groundwater tables,' 88 and the use of deed restrictions to limit future exposures at
partially-remediated sites.' 89 California environmental consultants are similarly
184. Cal. Consultant Interview 6 (Oct. 17, 2017).
185. Mass. Consultant Interview 1, supra note 165; Mass. Consultant Interview 4,
supra note 165 ("[T]hey've been fairly receptive, and in fact, they specifically reach out to us
for help when they're revising the regulations.").
186. Mass. Regulator Interview 1 (Dec. 7, 2017) ("[W]e have a pretty active
relationship with the Licensed Site Professional Association ... [W]e communicate with
them on policy developments and meet with them periodically.").
187. Letter from Paul McKinlay, LSP (LSPA President), and Wendy Rundle, to
Gerard Martin, MassDEP, Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup (Feb. 2, 2015) (on file with author).
188. Letter from Paul McKinlay, LSP (LSPA President), and Wendy Rundle, to Liz
Callahan, Action Division Director for Policy and Program Development, MassDEP, Bureau
of Waste Site Cleanup (Nov. 3, 2014) (on file with author).
189. Letter from Paul McKinlay, LSP (LSPA President), and Wendy Rundle, to
Margaret Shaw, MassDEP Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup (Sept. 22, 2014) (on file with
author).
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active in providing comments 190: "We have a really good relationship with [Office
of Planning and Research]' 9 ' staff," one California consultant remarked, and
"sometimes they'll have us take a look at a pre-administrative process draft, see what
we think." 192
Consultants are not the only ones telling government regulators about
compliance issues and costs; regulated industries routinely do the same thing. 193 But
the relationships between consultants and regulators are different than those between
regulated entities and regulators. The latter relationships are often adversarial and
distrustful, with each side viewing the other, at least to some extent, as the enemy.'
94
Additionally, as commentators have noted, another distinctive feature of many
regulator-regulated relationships-and a feature that intertwines in harmful ways
with distrust-is informational asymmetry, with regulated industries possessing
information that would be useful to regulators yet declining to share it,' 95 or sharing
190. As one California consultant explained:
So if the governor assigns a special task committee person and says "Hey,
we want to look at reducing vehicle miles traveled in California," one of
the first things [they're] going to do is reach out to California AEP and
say... "who in your organization is working on these issues?" And [AEP
has] a legislative committee, and they-there's a set call ... there's
constant dialogue about pending legislation.
Cal. Consultant Interview 3, supra note 181.
191. The Governor's Office of Planning and Research is an agency that "serve(s)
the Governor and his Cabinet as the staff for long-range planning and research, and
constitute(s) the comprehensive state planning agency." Governor's Office of Planning and
Research, About OPR, CA.cov, opr.ca.gov/about/ (last visited June 18, 2018).
192. Cal. Consultant Interview 6, supra note 184. Another consultant with prior
experience in state government emphasized that this was a relatively new role, and that
thinking through earlier regulatory changes was "99% done by in-house staff at OPR." Cal.
Consultant Interview 10 (Nov. 21, 2017).
193. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias towards Business?
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 128-29 (2006).
194. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1997) (noting that traditional administrative processes encourage
adversarial interactions between industry and regulators). This is not always true, and
interview subjects in both California and Massachusetts noted that there is broad and
increasing (though not universal) acceptance of the importance of environmental regulation
among the clients for whom they work. As one California attorney put it,
Everybody knows now who's under sixty-five or seventy years old-and
that's most of the people running business now-that environmentalism
is very important, it's a real issue, it's not bullshit. And here in California
in particular people care about it, and we have really strong laws. So you
just have to deal with it.
Cal. Attorney Interview 10 (Nov. 9, 2017).
195. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DuKE
L.J. 1619, 1619 (2004).
2019] CONSULTANTS 851
it in strategically selective ways.' 9 6 In contrast, regulators tend to perceive
consultants as trusted sources of useful information.
Regulators consistently echoed these themes. For example, one
Massachusetts regulator described consultants' comments on potential regulatory
changes:
[A]lmost always, they're helpful. That's not to say we always agree
with them .... But I think for the most part they come across as being
sincere comments and you can see that the consultant has an issue in
making a positive change in the program .... And they're very useful
in terms of being able to get some background, different aspects of
the program. Sometimes they indicate things that are being
interpreted in different ways or things that are unclear .... 197
Another Massachusetts regulator provided a similar assessment, noting that
generally regulators rely on input in two different ways:
One would be, the consultants tend to have areas of expertise where
they're trained, they're educated, and we actively want that technical
expertise involved .... And that may be expertise and a perspective
that a neighborhood group or an environmental group or somebody
from a law firm doesn't have .... And then there's also their client.
You know, they're representing a broad range of clients, most of
whom aren't really at the table. The people that actually own and
operate the locations are often ... kind of one-off clients .... So the
consultants actually almost have to provide the perspective of those
responsible parties [because] the [responsible parties] don't actually
show up.
198
Consultants consistently spoke of their interactions with regulators in
similar terms. As one Massachusetts consultant explained, when summarizing input
to regulators, "A lot of it has to do with ... just boots on the ground, the
implementation of things, and saying, 'hey, we found something that's a real
challenge." ' 199 Similarly, a California consultant noted that his colleagues'
comments and educational work draw on being "in the trenches every day, every
196. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 194, at 11-12 n.27 (quoting an EPA official:
"Usually, we get sent lots of information in the comment process but it's all in [the parties']
own self-interest.").
197. Mass. Regulator Interview 1, supra note 186. The regulator added,
[I]n their jobs, they're balancing pressure from clients to keep costs down
as well as trying to meet the regulations, so they have to bring those two
things together and that's why I would characterize their comments as
being pretty practical. I think you really can't do changes to the regulations
without getting the consultants' comments, because in our program...
they're the decision-makers and they're the ones who are making things
happen. So they're a highly valued set of comments that we get from
consultants.
Id.
198. Mass. Regulator Interview 5 (Dec. 21, 2017).
199. Mass. Consultant Interview 2 (Dec. 5, 2017).
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week, on a project-by-project basis, tailoring the principles of CEQA to specific
projects."2 Consultants also found regulators receptive to the input that grows out
of this experience. As one explained, when he offered to communicate, "they're very
cooperative. I never get no for an answer."2 0 ' Attorneys corroborated this view. As
one Massachusetts attorney put it, "DEP might not be as responsive as the private
sector would like it to be, but it certainly is responsive to input from the LSP
community."
' 2 02
For most consultants, these relationships seemed to involve genuine respect
for regulators rather than strategic posturing. Consultants did sometimes criticize
tendencies toward inertia or excessive caution, but they generally respected and
supported regulators' work.20 3 "Massachusetts DEP is a great regulating agency,"
one consultant stated, adding that the agency's staff is "in it for the same reason I'm
in it, to clean up the environment and do it practically and efficiently. '20 4 Somewhat
strikingly, and in contrast to most regulated businesses, some consultants also
offered effusive praise for written regulations. One consultant, while noting that
regulators "couldn't get the sites closed out," observed that "it was the state
employees that developed this wonderful set of tools we use called the MCP
regulations.
20 5
The strongest evidence of this neutral broker role emerged from
discussions of regulatory initiatives. But some consultants insisted that they
maintain this role even when directly representing clients on individual projects. For
example, one California consultant remarked:
I think a lawyer can be an advocate for a client. I don't see ourselves
as the advocate for the client in the majority of the work that we do.
And while on the surface that might sound a bit odd, because we're
working for the clients, the strength that I bring, that our firm brings
to a CEQA analysis, is the objective scientific analysis .... And
when I go in front of the agencies, or any type of reviewer, and I'm
seen as the scientific expert and saying, "these are the facts," then that
serves the client a lot more than a person that's advocating for the
client.
20 6
200. Cal. Consultant Interview 6, supra note 184.
201. Mass. Consultant Interview 2, supra note 199.
202. Mass. Attorney Interview 4 (Dec. 5, 2017).
203. E.g., Mass. Consultant Interview 2, supra note 199 (noting that after recent
retirements, [I]t's pretty thin [at DEP] right now.").
204. Mass. Consultant Interview 7 (Feb. 1, 2018). The consultant also added,
"Sometimes financial realities may escape them to a degree." Id.
205. Mass. Consultant Interview 10 (Feb. 28, 2018); Cal. Consultant Interview 11
(Nov. 30, 2017) ("1 find myself simultaneously being sympathetic to [clients needing
approvals] and helping them get through the process quicker, but also being really thankful
for the San Francisco Planning Department ... Those people are trying to do good work. I
really believe that .... ).
206. Cal. Consultant Interview 2 (Oct. 6, 2017); Mass. Consultant Interview 2,
supra note 199 ("I've seen lawyers who I certainly respect toe the line where I think, 'wow,
I couldn't do that.' Like I feel like I'd be putting my license at risk if I was doing that."). A
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Another echoed this view:
I think that most people that are actively engaged in our
profession ... would pretty consistently say that our job as
environmental professionals is to be a neutral third party. We don't
advocate for projects and we don't advocate against projects. Our job
is to compile meaningful repositories of data to help decision-makers
make good decisions.
207
Those quotes may sound self-serving, of course. 20 8 Many people view their
own work through rose-colored lenses, and that seems particularly likely for people
who have worked in the same field for decades, as many of my research subjects
had. But there are reasons against discounting these claims too much. Serving as
neutral brokers reconciles, at least to some extent, the conflicting incentives
consultants face. They need good relationships with their clients but also with
regulators; and while regulation creates challenges for them and their clients, it also
keeps them in business. 20 9 Add those incentives together, and sometimes the easiest
course of action can be to simply play it straight.
The consultants' claims to serve as honest information brokers, at least in
policymaking processes, also are consistent with the written comments that
few consultants questioned these distinctions. E.g., Cal. Consultant Interview 10, supra note
192 ("I haven't really seen a big difference at all between the approach of the lawyers and the
consultants. I think the lawyers usually keep us being more conservative in our approaches
and documenting our approach .... But I don't see a huge difference in how we approach
things other than that.").
207. Cal. Consultant Interview 3, supra note 181; Cal. Consultant Interview 4 (Oct.
10, 2017) ("[W]e're very particular about not having our clients dictate results to us."); Cal.
Consultant Interview 7, supra note 180 ("[T]his may sound like a soundbite, but at the end of
the day, all I've got is my reputation. And so if I'm just a hired gun, that kind of thing gets
around."); Mass. Consultant Interview 5 (Feb. 1, 2018) ("We do our best [to] find the
reasonable, technically-based place to be."). As one California consultant put it,
my company will play up... the fact that we seldom get into the role of.
• . advocacy and we really do stick more to the science. And that has
allowed us ... to actually problem-solve more with the regulatory
agencies because they see us as a trusted partner and not that we're trying
to pull something over on them.
Cal. Consultant Interview 9 (Nov. 16, 2017).
208. They also suggest greater differences between consultants and lawyers than
the rest of my research would support. Both consultants and lawyers stressed that they are
typically working together toward shared goals and with somewhat overlapping
responsibilities. Consultants and lawyers also often volunteered-unprompted-that they
generally like working with each other. E.g., Cal. Attorney Interview 10, supra note 177
("Some of my best friends are consultants. I hang out with them."). He then added, "I hear
these guys bitch about obnoxious lawyers they have to deal with and how full of themselves
they are, how arrogant they are. And you know the type, I'm sure." Id.
209. See Cal. Consultant Interview 6, supra note 184 ("Businesses like ours prosper
in part because of CEQA requirements."); Mass. Regulator Interview 1, supra note 186
(commenting on the absence of a notable deregulatory bent to the consultants' comments, the
regulator remarked, "Sometimes we wonder if they're kind of indifferent to that because it
represents work for them either way.").
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consultants submit to regulators. Those comments lack the histrionics and rhetorical
flourishes that fill the writings of many other participants in environmental
debates.210 Instead of fundamental philosophical disagreement, they offer windows
into conversations among technocrats, all of whom are looking for reasonable ways
to get a job done. 211
Finally, though here the evidence is less consistent, these claims are
consistent with some nonconsultants' descriptions of consultant-regulator
relationships. 212 As one attorney put it, "I feel like the consultants are seen less as
advocates for developers or private interests ... I feel that they do have a higher
level of credibility. ' 213 A California government attorney familiar with legislative
and rulemaking debates offered a similar observation: "they're engaged. But...
they approach it from a technical point of view. You know, not whether [the]
provision is good or bad, but ... how it works, if it's sort of feasible. ' 214 And a
Massachusetts attorney, describing interactions between consultants and the
Massachusetts DEP, noted:
There's a great deal of, I would say, respect between the LSP
community and Mass DEP, and of recognition that we're kind of in
this together. That doesn't mean the DEP's going to take the LSPA's
comments and say, "oh, that's what the LSPA wants, we're going to
do it." But they will listen.
215
Not everyone shared these views. Most bluntly, one private-sector attorney
remarked:
[S]ome people have taken the position that, you know, consultants
don't really just work for clients, they have a kind of public mandate
for environmental protection, and most consultants that I know and
210. See, e.g., Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH
L. REv. 1, 2 (2017) (quoting overwrought reactions to a water quality rulemaking); JOHN
MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID 166 (1971) (describing the Sierra Club's
famous-and effective-full-page New York Times advertisements opposing dams).
211. See, e.g., Letter from Paul McKinlay, LSP, and Wendy Rundle to Gerard
Martin, MassDEP, Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup, supra note 187 (offering prose devoid of
any rhetorical flourish).
212. One consultant-turned-attorney described the challenges of making this shift.
The attorney described how a first-year law professor talked about the need to
spin the facts ... And it drove me crazy for the first little while. It's like,
they're the facts, you can't-and that was kind of a breakthrough moment,
of trying to transition from engineering mode ... to realizing that spinning
them in the law was a big deal.
Cal. Attorney Interview 1 (Oct. 10, 2017).
213. Id.; Cal. Attorney Interview 5, supra note 177 ("[T]hey envision their role as
being better off to be neutral. So they don't ever want to get caught looking like a developer's
EIR preparer."); Cal. Attorney Interview 10, supra note 177 ("They do want to be objective
and they do want to be credible and they know that they need to maintain their credibility, not
just with the lead agency but also with the other agencies they interact with .....
214. Cal. Attorney Interview 6 (Nov. 7, 2017).
215. Mass. Attorney Interview 1 (Dec. 11, 2017).
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all the lawyers that I know and all the clients that I know think that's
complete bullshit.216
An environmental group attorney likewise commented that she had never
seen a situation "where the consultant expressed some kind of opinion that diverged
from what the client was pushing for at that point.1217 But other nonconsultants,
while observing that not all consultants aspire toward a neutral role, thought that
those who did provided more value. As one client representative explained:
I'd characterize (some) as your A-team of consultants ... they've
built up that credibility with regulators .... And there are some that
are just focused on getting the project through .... It sounds very
harsh, but I'd put them on a lower tier, just in terms of quality or value
that they're bringing to our organization.
218
There were also some caveats to these claims of positive consultant-
regulator relationships. Particularly in Massachusetts, consultants and regulators
alike noted that they often disagree on the degree of investigation that sites require.
As one consultant put it, "in the interaction I've had with regulators, absolutely I
would say we're not on the same page. I mean, I think we're advocating for
economic development .... Let's not get mired down in a research project. ' 219 One
regulator, after saying that he "was always having these really constructive, very
positive conversations with consultants," noted that others in government would
hear "reams of complaints" from consultants, and concluded that "the consultants
were having two sets of conversations," one of which was primarily devoted to
gripes.2 20 Concerns about the quality of consultants' advice also arose. 221 But the
overall emphasis of the comments, from regulators, private attorneys, and
consultants alike, was upon the existence of a constructive and technically-informed
partnership to implement and improve the regulatory program. And consultants
were essential to that partnership. Though part of the private sector, they were
widely perceived as facilitators of better relationships between regulators and the
regulated.
2. The Environmentalist Consultant
The foregoing discussion concludes that consultants perceive themselves
as neutral facilitators trying to find efficient accommodations between the mandates
of environmental laws and the goals of businesses. That finding alone contrasts with
the standard expectation that private businesses generally oppose public regulation
or seek to manipulate it to their own ends. 222 And a differently shaded picture also
216. Mass. Attorney Interview 4, supra note 202.
217. Cal. Attorney Interview 12 (June 4, 2019).
218. Cal. Client Interview 2 (Nov. 20, 2017).
219. Mass. Consultant Interview 4, supra note 165. However, the consultant added,
"Yes, I can certainly think of examples where my clients would love for things to be more
lenient, and I don't... advocate for that because it's not in the interest of public health." Id.
220. Mass. Regulator Interview 2, supra note 151.
221. Cal. Attorney Interview 5, supra note 177 ("[T]heir experts, while often
nominally experts, are often young people out of college with the right degree.").
222. See supra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
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emerged from the interviews and documents. Consultants, government officials, and
lawyers all described, and the written record documents, consultants advocating an
agenda-albeit gently and with modest impact 223-of strengthening environmental
law. In other words, consultants saw themselves not just as neutral facilitators
seeking to serve their clients through an accommodational approach toward
regulators, but also as ambassadors trying to advance environmental protection.
224
The evidence of consultants' modest activism begins with their own
descriptions of their professional identity. Particularly in California, there was a
normative element, sometimes hinted at and sometimes explicitly mentioned, in the
ways consultants described their work.225 For example, the California Association
of Environmental Professionals, which many consultants identify as representing
the interests of their field, describes itself as "a non-profit association of public and
private-sector professionals with a common interest in serving the principles
underlying the California Environmental Quality Act. ' 226 Its president, in his
February 2017 message to membership, began by noting that "[o]ur federal
environmental policies and institutions are already under siege and I know that many
AEP members are deeply troubled by this. ' 227 Similarly, individual consultants
referred to themselves as "enviromnentalists," 228 or talked about "working with
clients to plan and develop projects in a sustainable and environmentally sound
manner." 229
223. Cal. Attorney Interview 6, supra note 214 ("[T]hey have always offered
themselves to me and my colleagues that work on CEQA, which is helpful. But they're just
not usually a major force on bills.").
224. Cal. Consultant Interview 3, supra note 181. She explained:
I've always thought it is the attorney's job to-they have a responsibility
to advocate on behalf of their client, including exploiting whatever
loopholes and shortcomings exist in adopted statutes, regulations, and
practice. And I think the difference for environmental consultants ... I
think our job is to advocate on the legislative intent of CEQA.
Id.
225. There are intriguing parallels between these roles and idealistic descriptions
of an ethical lawyer's role. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law as a Public Calling, 49
MD. L. REv. 255, 255 (1990).
226. CAL. ASS'N ENVTL. PROF., https://www.califaep.org/ (last visited Sept. 7,
2019); see also About, CAL. Ass'N ENVTL. PROF., https://www.califaep.org/about.php (last
visited Sept. 7, 2019) ("The specific and primary purposes of the association are to establish
and operate a professional association of persons involved in and committed to improving the
processing and implementation of environmental assessment, analysis, public disclosure, and
reporting.").
227. Devin Muto, President's Message February 2017, CAL. ASS'N ENVTL.
PROF., https://web.archive.org/web/20170609055410/https://www.califaep.org/about-
aep/president-message (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
228. Cal. Consultant Interview 11 (Nov. 30, 2017) ("I'm an environmentalist and
someone who cares about the environment and public health and environmental
justice .. ").
229. E.g., Cal. Consultant Interview 2, supra note 206 ("[F]rom my personal
perspective, as someone that's focused on stewardship of the environment, I certainly think
that [the CEQA process] has value.").
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These idealistic views extended to participatory processes as well as
environmentally beneficial outcomes. 230 As one consultant asserted, after explaining
some of his firm's pioneering efforts to provide translators at public meetings:
[P]ublic participation and.., public disclosure ... [they're] basic,
foundational aspect[s] of CEQA, and NEPA too. Not hiding, doing
things in a vacuum, but letting people who are going to be affected
by things know what's going on and giving them the opportunity to
participate .... There's the science part of it, but then the public
access and public disclosure are very key elements of both of those
laws, in my view."
231
Or, as another experienced consultant explained:
I think the most fundamental thing CEQA did when it was passed is
it opened up the door, right? It turned on the lights and blew the
smoke out of the smoke-filled rooms .... It allows the public ... to
speak truth to power, to hold the decision-makers accountable .... 232
Many consultants thought such views were typical in the field. One
California consultant observed that "the vast majority of [California Association of
Environmental Professionals'] members got into this profession because they have
a strong belief in the goals of the environmental laws .... "233 As another California
consultant put it, "none of us are motivated solely by money... [E]ven the smartest
people in our profession, if they were in some other profession, they could make a
lot more money. ' 234 Attorneys echoed that view. As one remarked, "you probably
would find empirical support for the assumption that the kind of person that becomes
an environmental consultant is more likely to have very high commitment to
environmental protection.
235
That environmental consultants might express these views may seem
unsurprising. After all, environmental protection and public disclosure can seem like
things anyone would like. But to place these comments in context, it is worth noting
that many people, even in politically liberal places like California, say very different
things about environmental laws, and about regulation more generally. Indeed, the
critiques are often particularly pointed when critics discuss the kind of procedural
230. E.g., Cal. Consultant Interview 8, supra note 181; Cal. Consultant Interview
11, supra note 228 ("I come to all of this with a very heavy interest in civic engagement and
participatory planning.").
231. Cal. Consultant Interview 4, supra note 207.
232. Cal. Consultant Interview 8, supra note 181. These views of the consulting
industry were not universally shared. One attorney charged that "where [consultants] have
had some influence is turning the comments, the hearing on a draft EIR in most places [into]
the most boring, uninformative waste of time you can imagine." Id.
233. Cal. Consultant Interview 9, supra note 207; Cal. Consultant Interview 5,
supra note 180 (JA] lot of the people we hire young, I think their dream job would have been
to go work for The Nature Conservancy.").
234. Cal. Consultant Interview 4, supra note 207.
235. Cal. Attorney Interview 10, supra note 177.
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environmental statutes that the California consultants were praising. Regulated
industry representatives and many agency staff have little love for these statutes,
which they often blame for "analysis paralysis. ' 237 Many environmentalists question
whether laws like CEQA or NEPA actually lead to better or more democratic
decisions, and view them as useful primarily as tools for "monkey-wrenching"-
that is, throwing spokes into the wheels of unwanted projects. 238 Even sympathetic
academic writing questions whether the laws are premised on unrealistic hopes for
synoptic, rational analysis and robust public debate, and suggests they may be useful
primarily as penalty-default systems rather than as tools for fostering deliberation. 239
One California attorney, who bluntly dismissed CEQA as "a piece of shit,"
characterized his cynicism this way:
[I]t's utterly ridiculous, and I do it, and I get paid boatloads of money
to do it, and thank you very much fucked-up law, fucked-up judges,
fucked-up people in the community. I'll get paid either way .... It's
hugely time-consuming, largely irrelevant, and doesn't serve the
world except it serves the economy of everybody in it.
240
Consultants' positive views of CEQA were by no means a given. Instead, they differ
from the views of many other participants in the environmental field.
Participants in the Massachusetts waste-site-cleanup program expressed
similar views, though not as forcefully. As one consultant explained, "I would
definitely say we're client advocates. You have to be, because your client is who's
paying the bills for you. But ... I think LSPs in general are people who are interested
in preserving the environment and protecting it."' 24 ' An attorney, while discussing
consultants' rulemaking comments, put it similarly:
I think that my clients are more focused on, "can I get from where I
am to closure." And LSPs, when they're thinking about commenting
on rules, I think they're concerned about that issue, yes, but also...
"are you protecting the environment?" I do think LSPs vocalize a
concern about protecting the environment more than lawyers or
236. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, 115TH CONG.,
MEMORANDUM ON THE FULL COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT HEARING TITLED, "THE WEAPONIZATION
OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWFARE" 2-4 (Apr. 23, 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/1100/20180425/
108215/HHRG-115-1100-20180425-SD027.pdf (discussing "the weaponization" of NEPA).
For an academic summary of these critiques, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA ?, 12
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 341-42 (2004) (summarizing the views of the "NEPA skeptic").
237. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, supra note
236.
238. Karkkainen, supra note 236, at 339-40.
239. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 925-26
(2002); Karkkainen, supra note 236, at 338 (arguing that NEPA does have value, but
primarily as a deterrent to environmentally harmful projects rather than as a tool to foster
deliberative decision-making and public participation).
240. Cal. Attorney Interview 5, supra note 177.
241. Mass. Consultant Interview 6 (Feb. 1, 2018).
2019] CONSULTANTS 859
clients. I mean, I think they view their profession as a net benefit to
the earth of doing good. 42
Another attorney echoed that view:
Once you get away from individual cases and you get to the program,
that's where I'm more inclined to acknowledge a broader sense of
purpose for the LSPs .... [I]t's not just having the program work
better for clients, it's having a better program, period. They really...
do care about this stuff, they like this stuff, it's interesting, and they
want the program to work for everybody. . .. [P]eople spend
actually provide many, many free hours, involving themselves in
stakeholder groups when there are regulation changes either the DEP
is proposing or the LSPs have concluded on their own would be
appropriate or necessary.
243
More generally, consultants in both Massachusetts and California
conveyed a positive view of environmental regulation, not just the specific programs
in which they work. As one California consultant explained:
I think there is an ambassador quality that comes with any
profession... The big myth I'm working on dispelling, at the
national level, we hear, with the current administration, day in and
day out, talk about how the environment is holding the economy back.
There's not a grain of truth in that .... So I do feel that as
environmental professionals, we have a responsibility to kind of
dispel those kinds of myths and misstatements.
2 44
As that last quote captures, the consultants' environmentalism is of a
distinctly business-friendly type. It rejects the assumption-which is widely adopted
by many other businesses, environmental groups, and politicians-that
environmental protection and business are necessarily in conflict. 45 And it also
aligns, as some consultants acknowledged, with the consulting industry's own
business interests. 246 But it still reflects a cultural commitment to the goals of
environmental law.
3. Specific Initiatives and Controversies
On their own, consultants' proclamations that they are trusted information
brokers, or that they work to advance the basic goals of environmental law, might
just be cheap talk. But in several different ways, consultants have taken, or at least
242. Mass. Attorney Interview 1, supra note 215.
243. Mass. Attorney Interview 4, supra note 202. That same attorney questioned
whether LSPs bring some broader public mandate to individual client representation. See
Freeman, supra note 194.
244. Cal. Consultant Interview 3, supra note 181.
245. See Alana Semuels, Do Regulations Really Kill Jobs?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 19,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/regulations-jobs/513563/
(describing political rhetoric attacking "job-killing regulations").
246. E.g., Cal. Consultant Interview 6, supra note 184 (" [Y]es, businesses like ours
prosper in part because of CEQA requirements.").
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attempted, action consistent with these claims. Two examples, each of which
illustrates both the trusted facilitator and the practical environmentalist roles, appear
below. As readers will note, these are not dramatic stories-or, at least, they are not
stories in which consultants played particularly dramatic roles. In the grand play of
environmental law, environmental consultants are hardly ever the most noticeable
actors on the stage." Instead, the theme is relatively measured support for
incremental improvements to regulatory systems. But that kind of incrementalism is
often crucial to the success of a legal regime.
a. Creating the Massachusetts LSP Program
In multiple ways, consultants helped forge the LSP program and ensure its
continued vitality. Their efforts began with the study group that recommended the
creation of the program. Fellow participants described the group's consultants as
key participants. 48 "[W]e were lucky," one regulator explained, "because the
consultants we had were top-notch. They really knew their stuff .... [T]hey had a
huge positive influence." 49 The regulator added:
I also have to say that these consultants were pretty environmentally
oriented. ... [T]hey believed the site should be cleaned up. They
believed people should be protected. They understood there was a real
public health hazard for most of them. Now sometimes they felt we
went overboard in terms of our protectiveness and we had reasonable
discussions about what level of cleanup at a particular site or... what
the standard should be .... But conceptually, they were very
supportive .... [T]he environmentalists never pretended to be
technical experts. The responsible parties were not technical experts.
So between the consultants ... and my staff, that was where all the
technical expertise came from, and it was good to have both ....
[W]e got a lot of credibility out of it by having good-quality,
vociferous input from the consultants. So they felt heard and we often
agreed with them.
250
Once the working group issued its recommendations and the legislature
enacted them into law, consultants continued helping to build a successful regulatory
system. Massachusetts DEP needed to create the regulatory architecture for the LSP
program, which meant, among other things, drafting an enormous regulatory
247. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (noting consultants' relatively quiet
roles in policy advocacy).
248. While consultants played important roles, they did not come up with the LSP
concept. Mass. Consultant Interview 1, supra note 165 ("The fact that Rob Sargent, the guy
from MassPIRG, is the one that suggested licensing consultants ... I think says something.").
249. Mass. Regulator Interview 3, supra note 153. The consultants did oppose a
model in which one firm would do the work and another would certify its completeness. "The
consultants, as you would imagine, said, essentially, 'screw that.' If we're taking the
responsibility and the liability, we at least want to be able to do the work and make some
money at it on that side." Mass. Consultant Interview 1, supra note 165.
250. Mass. Regulator Interview 3, supra note 153; Mass. Regulator Interview 4
(Dec. 18, 2017) ("Because they are technically trained, you can have a technical conversation
with them, and we had many .... ).
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handbook for site cleanups. 1 Consultants remained heavily involved in that effort.
As one explained:
[T]he regulations were written by folks at the DEP, but we would sit
in a room with them while they were writing certain sections and
make suggestions... We were always thinking about, well, is this
really a practical way to do it, or is there a better way? But the
regulators were definitely on board with the fact that we kind of all
worked together to make this happen. And it wasn't biased, in any
way, other than, you know, everyone's goal was to protect public
health and the environment.
252
Similarly, consultants helped set up and give life to the governance
structures of the new system. They serve on the LSP licensing board, which created
and administered the LSP licensing exam, reviewed applications to become LSPs,
and handled disciplinary proceedings against LSPs. In those roles, nonconsultants
told me, the consultants were tough critics of their peers; they were determined to
establish the credibility of their new profession and had little patience with what
they saw as shoddy work.253 In part because of these efforts, consultants, lawyers,
and regulators all agreed that the quality of present-day work is high. "[I]n any
system," one consultant explained, "there are people who will abuse it. Most of
those, at this point ... have been weeded out.
254
This type of close relationship might raise concerns of regulatory
capture, 255 but participants generally rejected those concerns. Both consultants and
regulators generally agreed that while staff members at Massachusetts DEP's
Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup listened to and trusted the consultants, they also
remained strongly committed to their role of providing oversight.2 5 6 Perhaps more
tellingly, environmental activists agreed with this assessment. As one explained,
when asked about capture, "I think there are parts of DEP where that has happened.
I don't think it has happened in the Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup. ' 257 Another
succinctly remarked that "DEP in Massachusetts was very, very good.
258
251. Massachusetts Contingency Plan, supra note 157.
252. Mass. Consultant Interview 3 (Jan. 31, 2018).
253. Mass. Regulator Interview 3, supra note 153 ("[T]hey were pretty hard on their
peers because they wanted to make sure that the profession had credibility.").
254. Mass. Consultant Interview 1, supra note 165.
255. "Regulatory capture" typically refers to situations in which private groups
coopt government regulators to serve those private groups' own ends. See Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101
GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013).
256. E.g., Mass. Regulator Interview 1, supra note 186 ("We continue to do
enforcement actions against the same people who come to our meetings. That can be a little
awkward. But it's not as if we ever choose not to do something because we have-otherwise
have-a pretty good working relationship with someone.").
257. Mass. Advocate Interview 2, supra note 167; Mass. Advocate Interview 3
(May 16, 2019) ("My experience just shows me that when it comes to protecting drinking
water, DEP does not cave.").
258. Mass. Advocate Interview 1 (Dec. 31, 2018).
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In summary, consultants played, and continue to play, integral parts in
designing, building, and maintaining a regulatory program that is widely perceived
as highly successful. They did so both by serving as trusted intermediaries between
regulators and the business sector and by bringing their own environmental values
into the regulatory system.
b. CEQA Reform
The second example comes from California, where consultants have been
deeply involved in efforts to redirect and reform CEQA compliance. Most
prominently, they have helped integrate climate change assessment into CEQA
compliance, and they have cast themselves as moderating voices in debates about
whether CEQA inhibits housing development and good urban planning. In these
efforts, as in the formation of the Massachusetts LSP program, consultants were not
crusaders at the environmental frontier. They instead have focused on trying to
ensure that expansions in CEQA's coverage were workable and that reforms did not
undercut the statute's core goals. But they have also staked out clear positions as
believers in and supporters of CEQA's requirements.
The intersection of CEQA and climate change emerged as an important
legal issue in the mid-2000s, when climate activists realized that the George W.
Bush Administration would never do anything meaningful to respond to the
problem.259 Attention then turned to potential remedies under existing laws, and in
California, that meant a turn to CEQA. 260 Environmental groups, led by the Center
for Biological Diversity, began submitting comments demanding that local
governments address the climate impacts of their proposed development plans, and
then followed up those comments with lawsuits. 26' Those groups soon gained a
powerful ally, as the California Attorney General's office began its own litigation
campaign.2 62 The intersection of climate change and CEQA became one of the
hottest topics in California environmental law and a subject of national policy and
academic interest, with debates raging about whether climate analyses fit into CEQA
259. See Dave Owen, Climate Change and Environmental Assessment Law, 33
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 57, 72 (2008) (describing federal inaction).
260. See, e.g., Letter from Matthew Vespa et al. to The Honorable Daryl Busch and
City Council Members, City of Perris (Mar. 4, 2010), http:/Iblogs2.law.columbia.edu/
climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2010/20100305
_docket-E046237_settlement-agreement.pdf; Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Reclamation Bd. of
the Res. Agency of the State of Cal., No. 06 CS 01228 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Apr. 27, 2007) (rejecting
an argument that CEQA required analysis of a development project's climate-change-related
vulnerabilities).
261. CEQA Becomes Latest Battlefield in Dealing with Global Warming,
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL INSIDER (May 17, 2007), https://www.ceitoday.com (account
required to access article).
262. See Michael B. Gerrard, What the Law and Lawyers Can and Cannot Do
About Global Warming, 16 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 37 (2007) (describing litigation brought early
in this campaign against San Bernardino County).
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at all, which projects should trigger such requirements, and how-if at all-the
analyses ought to be done.
263
In 2007, the California Association of Environmental Professionals entered
the fray by publishing a white paper on CEQA and climate change. 264 The document
took few strong positions, other than asserting that government agencies should have
some discretion to choose the appropriate mode of analysis 265 and that climate
change adaptation should be a part of the CEQA inquiry. 266 Its primary focus instead
was on identifying multiple ways in which a climate change analysis could be
performed. 267 But importantly, the document took as a given that some CEQA
analysis would occur. It thus validated, and slightly advanced, the shift from treating
greenhouse gas analyses as an environmental litigants' aspiration to treating those
analyses as an accepted part of CEQA processes.
Over the next decade, the intersection of greenhouse gas regulation and
CEQA analysis continued to be controversial, and it has generated a series of new
legislative enactments, multiple court cases, and important regulatory changes.
268
Environmental consultants, working through a climate change committee at the
California Association of Environmental Professionals, 269 continued to churn out
white papers and comment letters, as well as meeting more informally with
regulatory staff.270 The themes of that work remained consistent with the initial
263. See, e.g., Katherine M. Baldwin, Note, NEPA and CEQA: Effective Legal
Frameworks for Compelling Consideration of Adaptation to Climate Change, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 769, 770-71 (2009); Owen, supra note 259, at 84.
264. See generally MICHAEL HENDRIX ET AL., ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
ANALYZING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN CEQA
DOCUMENTS (2007).
265. Id. at 10 ([JI]t is the responsibility of the Lead Agency to select the most
appropriate methodology based on the project's unique circumstances.").
266. See id. at 16-17 ("The effects that GCC may have on a specific project also
need to be considered in CEQA reviews .... It is hoped that a greater number of California
agencies will assess climate risks.").
267. Id.
268. See Ass'N OF ENVTL. PROF'LS, BEYOND 2020 AND NEWHALL: A FIELD GUIDE
TO NEW CEQA GREENHOUSE GAS THRESHOLDS AND CLIMATE ACTION PLAN TARGETS FOR
CALIFORNIA 14-23 (2016) (summarizing legislation, executive orders, regulatory changes,
and court cases).
269. One consultant explained how this work was funded:
The work on AEP policy-type or guidance papers, actually all work for
AEP by Consultants with "day jobs", is not funded by grants or outside
parties .... Consultants either volunteer their time or fold it into overhead
time that could be paid by their employer as another part of her or his job.
Most often, I've observed it is a combination of both.
Email from Environmental Consultant to Author, May 30, 2018, 7:45 AM PST (on file with
author).
270. See, e.g., Letter from American Planning Association, California Chapter, to
Christopher Calfee, Special Counsel, Natural Resources Agency (Aug. 17, 2009),
http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/Proposed-amendments-comments/American-Planning-A
ssociationCalifornia Chapter.pdf (emphasizing the importance of analysis of climate
impacts upon projects and of associated mitigation measures).
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white paper. 7" The consultants left the task of pushing the legal envelope to
environmental groups, the Attorney General's office, and elected politicians;
instead, the consultants focused on asking for regulations that provided manageable
standards, preserved agency discretion, and clarified the interactions among
different provisions of governing law.272 But they coupled those efforts with the
publication of a series of papers designed to guide local governments through the
complex processes of calculating current emissions and projecting future outputs. 273
In other words, the core goal was to take emerging legal requirements and make
them workable, both by obtaining clarity and flexibility from regulators and by
providing regulated entities with the tools they needed to meet the emerging
standards.
274
Consultants have played similar, and sometimes more publicly assertive,
roles in other CEQA reform debates. In recent years, some CEQA critics have
blamed the statute for thwarting development within already-urbanized areas-
which are precisely the areas where, for a host of environmental reasons,
development ought to occur. 275 According to this critique, CEQA is widely used by
entrenched, wealthy, and often white neighborhoods to thwart development, driving
271. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., Brief for California Ass'n of Councils of Govts et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Cleveland Nat'l Forest Found. v. San Diego Ass'n of Govts,
397 P.3d 989 (Cal. 2017) (No. S223603), 2015 WL 7313506 at *6 (arguing, in a case
involving CEQA review of greenhouse gas emissions for a regional growth plan, for a more
deferential standard of review than environmental plaintiffs or the California Attorney
General's office had urged).
273. See Ass'N OF ENVTL. PROF'LS, supra note 268; AEP CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMITTEE'S "THE CALIFORNIA SUPPLEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COMMUNITY-WIDE
GREENHOUSE GAS (GHG) EMISSIONS PROTOCOL" (2013); ASSOCIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROFESSIONALS (AEP), FORECASTING COMMUNITY-WIDE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SETTING REDUCTION TARGETS (2012) (draft report); ASSOCIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROFESSIONALS (AEP), CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY-WIDE GREENHOUSE GAS BASELINE
INVENTORY PROTOCOL WHITE PAPER (2011).
274. Email from Environmental Consultant, supra note 269 ("The motivation of
AEP and APACA is what I would describe as supporting effective and efficient government
decision-making regarding environmental issues, or 'good government decision-making."').
Of course, consultants were also trying to supply tools that those same consultants might be
hired to use on clients' behalf. As one environmental group attorney wryly observed when
discussing the evolution of climate analyses: "I don't know if it's symbiosis or parasitism, or,
just kind of, almost like an ecosystem of influences that are continually generating the need
for more expert support to deal with... how the law is evolving." Cal. Attorney Interview 13
(June 17, 2019).
275. See Jennifer Hernandez, California Environmental Quality Act Lawsuits and
California's Housing Crisis, 24 HASTINGS ENVTL. L.J. 21, 21 (2017) ("Most of the challenged
projects are precisely the types of projects and plans that today's environmental and climate
policies seek to promote."). Hernandez qualifies her arguments by observing that CEQA
"continues to play a vital role" in limiting environmental impacts and compelling disclosure.
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up housing costs and harming people throughout the state.2 16 More generally, some
critics allege that CEQA analysis for urban projects has become an expensive
charade that has little to do with facilitating environmental protection or good
planning.
277
Consultants have brought different perspectives to, and have taken
different positions in, these debates. Their views of the CEQA process were
generally more positive than those held by the more critical attorneys, and also
exhibited less of a range than those of attorneys. While some expressed frustration
with particular ways the CEQA process is used, 278 they consistently expressed a
positive vision of the law. As one put it, in a typical remark, "I think we generally
believe in the CEQA process as one that plays an important role in government
decision-making, [and] contributes to good government, when done well. ' 27 9 They
also have translated that belief into advocacy. For example, a group known as the
Enhanced CEQA Action Team, which brought together consultants and attorneys,
formed for the express purpose of "improv[ing] the effectiveness and efficiency of
the environmental review process in a manner that helps lead agencies protect the
environment, promote public involvement, and make well-informed decisions.
280
276. Cal. Attorney Interview 5, supra note 177 (criticizing "a bunch of white people
trying to protect their stuff"). For research suggesting that these problems arise primarily from
discretionary zoning review rather than from CEQA, see generally MOIRA O'NEILL ET AL.,
GETTING IT RIGHT: EXAMINING THE LOCAL LAND USE ENTITLEMENT PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA
TO INFORM POLICY AND PROCESS (2018).
277. See, e.g., Chiang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, How Local Housing
Regulations Smother the U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/opinion/housing-regulations-us-economy.html ("The
California Environmental Quality Act... was written to protect green areas from pollution
and degradation from large industrial projects, like new refineries or power plants. Its main
effect today is making urban housing more expensive."); Scott Peters, CEQA an Obstacle for
Needed Housing in California, SAN DINGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Mar. 3, 2017),
https ://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sd-utbg-ceqa-obstacles-peters-
20170302-story.html ("[L]et's end-not excuse-CEQA's undemocratic, counterproductive
paperwork and litigation obstacles to good development."). Peters, a Democrat, served in the
state Legislature at the time he wrote this op-ed.
278. E.g., Cal. Consultant Interview 1, supra note 175 ("I have a real problem when
CEQA kind of gets co-opted by groups like, you know, unions and others, where there's a
kind of strong-arming going on to make sure that certain stakeholders are getting their way.").
279. Cal. Consultant Interview 6, supra note 184; Cal. Consultant Interview 3,
supra note 181 ("1 think people with experience have found that environmental process, if
used wisely, can help you build a better project and have less risk during construction."); Cal.
Consultant Interview 5, supra note 180 ("IF]or those agencies that really take it seriously,
that's the part I like about it, is that it really is, in my mind, CEQA as it's supposed to be. The
public's involved, everybody's open-minded. The alternatives are on the table and you can
pick anything that is logical."); Cal. Consultant Interview 7, supra note 180 ("1 believe in the
process. I think that CEQA is a good law.").
280. Legislative Proposals to Enhance Five Key Areas of the California
Environmental Quality Act, CEQA (2011), http://califaep.org/docs/ECAT-CEQA-
Amendment-ProposalSept-2011.pdf. [hereinafter ECAT Legislative Proposals]. This
mission, the report added, was "founded on the premise that CEQA is an important and
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The group's attempts to pursue that goal were generally modest and incremental;
they addressed matters like the severability of judicial remedies rather than
proposing fundamental changes to, or exemptions from, the statute. 281' And
conspicuously absent from these proposals were demands for fundamental statutory
revisions, or for major exceptions or gaps in coverage. Consultants' other CEQA
advocacy is similar in its focus and style. In a recent presentation to legislators, for
example, the California Association of Environmental Professionals pointedly
observed that "CEQA gets a bad rap" on housing issues, and that other factors
deserve greater attention. 28 2 And in letters to the California Resources Agency
(which issues and updates CEQA's implementing regulations), the California
Association of Environmental Professionals sometimes offers minor technical
corrections, 211 often supports proposed changes, 28 4 and sometimes offers more
substantive critique, 21' but nowhere in its correspondence does it launch
foundational attacks on CEQA itself. The overall thrust of these documents instead
is to draw upon consultants' expertise to make the regulatory process work more
smoothly.
In summary, none of these examples involves environmental consultants
chaining themselves to bulldozers or pushing for radical new environmental
legislation. Nor does any example involve consultants seeking to tear environmental
law apart. Instead, the theme is quiet, measured communication and gentle activism,
largely in favor of incremental improvements to the status quo. That theme sets
environmental consultants apart from many louder participants in environmental
law and politics, 28 6 and it may explain why their roles generally escape notice. But,
constructive element of California public agency decision-making .... This essential state
environmental law needs to be preserved through the incorporation of constructive
enhancements." Id. at 1.
281. See id. at 4. Some of these positions-particularly those seeking more
deferential standards of review-differ from those of the attorneys and environmental groups
that often challenge CEQA documents.
282. CAL. ASS'N OF ENVTL. PROF'LS, 2017 CEQA ISSUES: HOUSING,
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND THE CHANGING FEDERAL ENVIRONMENT 13 (2017),
https://www.califaep.org/docs/Final_2017_AEP-Hot Topics-3-15-2017.pptx.
283. E.g., Letter from Eugene Talmadge, President, Cal. Ass'n of Envtl. Prof'ls, to
Christopher Calfee, Governor's Office of Planning and Research (June 1, 2012) (on file with
author) (using a redline to provide very minor technical corrections).
284. See, e.g., id. ("The revised proposed amendments to the CEQA guidelines are
clear, concise, and well-organized."); see, e.g., Letter from Eugene Talmadge, President, Cal.
Ass'n of Envtl. Prof'ls, to Christopher Calfee, Governor's Office of Planning and Research
(Feb. 24, 2012) (on file with author) (supporting streamlining efforts and requesting minor
clarifying changes).
285. E.g., Letter from Devin Muto, Executive Vice-President, Cal. Ass'n of Envtl.
Prof'ls, to Christopher Calfee, Senior Counsel, and Holly Roberson, Land Use Counsel,
Governor's Office of Planning and Research (Oct. 12, 2015) (on file with author) (offering
extensive redlined edits with detailed explanations).
286. See Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2003) (describing the dominance of "warring camps" in environmental
policy debates).
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as the next Part explains, that sort of quiet insider work has an important place in a
functional environmental law system.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Stripped to its core, the discussion so far is a story of businesses
recognizing opportunities in regulatory constraints and showing some appreciation
for the laws that create those opportunities. That may sound like unsurprising human
behavior within a system of regulated capitalism. But that story nevertheless
contrasts in several important ways with conventional accounts of the roles of
private-sector, for-profit businesses, and this final Part therefore argues that these
environmental consulting stories offer important lessons. They offer new angles on
public-choice theory and privatization debates, showing how both private influence
and privatization can support public law values. They also shed new light on the
potential role of institutionalization in sustaining a movement, and on the roles
played by the private sector in the continuing evolution of environmental law.
A. Public-Choice Theory
For years, public-choice theory has offered one of the primary mechanisms
for understanding relationships between businesses and regulators, and for
understanding government regulation more generally. 28 7 According to traditional,
mainstream public-choice accounts, relationships between businesses and regulators
are defined primarily by rent-seeking, 288 as businesses seek to distort regulation to
serve their own ends, and regulators (and legislators) secure support by catering to
powerful businesses' needs.28 9 While some public-choice-influenced theorists have
suggested that citizen oversight and judicial review might provide a counterweight
to these problematic dynamics, 290 many public-choice theorists argue that self-
described public-interest groups really are just another special interest, and that their
activity just compounds the underlying problems. 29' It would be better, one might
conclude, to just minimize government regulation.
Some recent work has suggested an alternative, and moderately more
optimistic, twist on this classic theory. These researchers argue that by facilitating
the growth of businesses whose goals align with broader public interests, lawmakers
can increase political support for regulatory programs that advance those interests,
and thus harness public-choice dynamics to serve genuinely public ends. 292 For
example, laws that subsidize the growth of renewable energy businesses might build
political support for a carbon tax. But this otherwise-promising theoretical model
has two important limitations.
287. See supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
288. "In the field of public choice economics, 'rent-seeking' means the attempt to
increase one's share of existing wealth through political activity." Sensational Smiles, LLC
v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015).
289. See Weiner, supra note 89, at 754-55.
290. See Sax, supra note 87, at 560
291. E.g., Zywicki, supra note 90, at 899, 910-11.
292. See Meckling et al., supra note 92, at 1170-71: Biber, supra note 92, at 434,
452-53.
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First, while self-interest can explain why emerging industries might
support government regulation, the same logic also explains why incumbent
industries would try to use regulation to crush their emerging competition. 93 For the
model's positive feedback loops to begin, then, some other engine of reform must
exist. Second, in these accounts of strategic symbiosis, business remains a largely
amoral actor, which suggests it also remains dangerous.294 At some point, one might
expect, the no-longer-nascent industries will turn their attention to the traditional
pursuit of anti-competitive protectionism rather than to advancement of a public-
spirited legal regime. Crafting a regulatory system that genuinely serves public
interests, and ensuring that the system survives the buffeting winds of interest group
dynamics, therefore will remain tasks for public entities. And that work will likely
be difficult. Clearly there are some political moments when self-interested dynamics
weaken and public-spirited regulation can break through. 295 But even these modified
public-choice accounts raise as many questions as they answer about how the results
of these so-called republican moments can last.
However, the equation shifts if (as this Article finds) key elements of the
private sector are driven by values as well as profit motives. Then, the pressures
exerted by private industry, though still heavily influenced by economic incentives,
will at least be moderated and redirected by a set of public-spirited values. And while
a relatively small and quiet industry like environmental consulting might seem like
a weak counterweight to development or resource-extraction giants, public-choice
theory predicts that the consulting sector will be particularly well-positioned to
influence administrative policy. After all, a foundational public choice claim is that
discrete, focused groups with strong and shared interests will exert particularly
powerful influence upon political processes. 29 6 That description fits the consulting
industry well, even in comparison to other business interests, for its relationship with
and interests in regulation are exceedingly direct. Consequently, the consulting
industry gives environmental regulators allies who can help-indeed, need to help-
turn republican moments into lasting law.
That does not mean, of course, that the presence of the environmental
consulting industry removes any need to worry about interest group politics or
public-choice dynamics in environmental law. The industry does have its own
interests, and those will not always align with general public benefit. Tellingly,
some-though by no means all or even most-attorneys alleged that these dynamics
were at play in the increasing complexity of environmental compliance: "They've
got a multi-billion dollar industry going here," one attorney remarked. "And they
293. See, e.g., Froma Harrop, Opinion, Renewables Are Competitive, So Why Does
Windy Wyoming Tax its Turbines?, DEN. POST (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/02/06/renewables-are-competitive-so-why-does-windy-
wyoming-tax-its-turbines/ (tying taxes on renewable energy to political pressure from
established fossil fuel industries).
294. See generally Biber, supra note 92 (explaining business interests' political
participation in terms of economic self-interest, not values).
295. See Farber, supra note 3, at 65-66.
296. See OLSON, supra note 80, at 141-49.
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don't want a shortcut. I mean, the volume is how you make money."'297 Additionally,
the industry's power is modest, and it may well be limited by cultural factors. Public
advocacy doesn't come easily to many scientists or engineers. 98 Finally, because
this study focuses on just two sectors of a larger industry, it cannot support firm
conclusions about the industry as a whole. But even with those caveats, a focus on
the consulting industry can help us understand how functional and public-spirited
regulatory governance can emerge, even in a field where the interest group dynamics
described by public-choice theorists loom large.
B. Privatization
For similar reasons, the roles of environmental consultants hold lessons for
debates about privatization. In their classic framing, these debates pit advocates who
extoll the efficiency and creativity of the private sector against skeptics who worry
about the loss of the procedures and values underpinning public law.299 In the eyes
of the former group, privatization allows work to be done more nimbly, often by
people with more talent than those who choose to work within the civil service
system.300 To some adherents of this view-particularly those influenced by public-
choice theory-even the existence of a public-values-driven public sector is also
dubious. 30 ' But the latter group rejects this dark vision of the public sphere, at least
partially. It sees value in public governance, and it worries that privatization means
transferring important tasks to realms in which the procedural safeguards of public
law no longer apply, and to people who will prioritize profit over the broader
interests of the affected public. 30 2 The stark choice, then, is between private
efficiency and public values.
My consulting examples-particularly the Massachusetts story-lend
credence to the arguments in favor of privatization, but with some twists. The
Massachusetts LSP program came into existence at a time of privatization fervor
under a governor who strongly favored the privatization of governmental services,
and was justified largely in terms concordant with traditional privatization
rhetoric. 30 3 It is no wonder, then, that participants labeled it "the privatized model,"
a label that remains in widespread use to this day.3' And by many important
297. Cal. Attorney Interview 3, supra note 12.
298. See Denise Lach et al., Advocacy and Credibility of Ecological Scientists in
Resource Decisionmaking: A Regional Study, 53 BIOSCIENCE 170, 171 (2003)
("Traditionally, many scientists have been reluctant to become involved in policy
decisionmaking .... ).
299. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1290 (2003).
300. See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 22, at 4-6.
301. See Freeman, supra note 85, at 562.
302. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
303. Mass. Consultant Interview 1, supra note 165 ("So this sort of fit into the
governor's worldview as well."); Mass. Regulator Interview 3, supra note 249 ("One of the
mantras... of [the] taskforce was 'let the public sector do what it does best and let the private
sector do what it does best."').
304. E.g., What is a Licensed Site Professional, LSP ASS'N,
https://www.lspa.org/what-is-an-lsp (last visited June 22, 2018) ("In 1993, Massachusetts
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measures, the model has worked well. The statistics are compelling; hundreds of
Massachusetts sites have been cleaned up and have moved to closure, without
repeating the public-health debacles that initially led to the program's creation.30 5
Participants in the program perceive the model as highly successful, particularly
when they compare it to more traditional regulatory programs in other nearby
states.3 06 "We get it assessed," one consultant explained, "we get it cleaned up, and
we move on to some redevelopment much faster than in other New England states
because of the privatized program."30 7 Privatization, it would seem, worked as it was
supposed to.
But the first twist on this story is that calling the Massachusetts system "the
privatized program" or "rent-a-regulator" is misleading. 08 At the core of
Massachusetts' "privatized" program is a longstanding and deep commitment to
public regulation.309 Massachusetts DEP continues to develop and update what one
consultant described, without any hint of sarcasm, as "wonderful detailed
regulations" for site cleanups.1 Similarly, while LSPs make decisions about
individual sites, audits-and the associated possibility of losing a license-provide
a powerful incentive for careful work.3 1 ' The regulatory system does contain
created a model program that privatized the cleanup of hazardous waste sites in the
Commonwealth.").
305. See Collins, supra note 166 (providing multiple slides with statistics).
306. Mass. Consultant Interview 10, supra note 205 (comparing the Massachusetts
system to regulatory programs in New York and Vermont); Mass. Consultant Interview 3,
supra note 252 ("[W]e just put everything we had into putting a program together that didn't
exist, and it was a lot of hard work, but I think it's been very effective, and I think a lot of
people... [who] were involved in it, they all feel very good about it.")
307. Mass. Consultant Interview 2, supra note 199.
308. See Seifter, supra note 13, at 1095.
309. Among my Massachusetts interview subjects, the strongest critique I heard
was that this commitment was waning. One public health advocate argued that cuts to
Massachusetts' DEP's enforcement capacity had limited the threat posed by audits, and thus
the incentive for LSPs to do careful work. Mass. Advocate Interview 2, supra note 167. LSPs
did not mention a similar dynamic, though some did mention concerns about staffing cuts at
Massachusetts DEP.
310. Mass. Consultant Interview 8, supra note 73; Mass. Consultant Interview 6,
supra note 241 ("[T]he regulations are quite detailed .... I think that's part of what makes
the Massachusetts program work, is that ... it's all laid out there, what you have to do. It's
like a cookbook.., albeit a pretty complicated one.").
311. He explained:
[P]eople joke, when you get your LSP license, you have a target on your
chest because you have to go out on a limb and stamp these documents
and render your opinion, and it's true. And people are very careful about
what they do, and they make sure it's in compliance with the MCP because
once you do it, it's out there and you're-there's no statute of limitations
on when you might get an audit ....
Mass. Consultant Interview 7, supra note 204. Mass. Consultant Interview 10, supra note 205
("I don't make a decision on an LSP project without in the back of my mind thinking about
that LSP board."). As of May 15, 2018, the LSP Board's searchable database listed 30 LSPs
whose licenses had been revoked, surrendered, or suspended (plus two additional LSPs whose
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important private elements; as many participants noted, the incentives of private
lending institutions and potential purchasers also support careful site investigations
and cleanup work.312 And of course, the LSPs themselves are mostly private. But
public regulation generates and backstops these private incentives, and no one
involved in the program seems to lose sight of that important fact. 13 As the Licensed
Site Professional Association explained in a recent letter to the state, "[t]he success
of the Commonwealth's innovative, privatized waste site cleanup program is
dependent on high performance from all three 'arms' of the program: highly
competent and accountable LSPs, a strong regulatory framework and enforcement
presence, and a credible and consistent licensing board." '314
Neither the rhetoric of privatization nor the explicit emphasis on
government regulation is quite as prevalent with CEQA implementation, but the
benefits of partial privatization are readily apparent there as well. Rather than assign
environmental assessments to in-house staff, who lack expertise in environmental
licenses had been suspended for non-payment of fees). The database does not provide
information about why these licenses were lost, but LSPs do sometimes surrender their
licenses to settle disciplinary proceedings. See BD. OF REGISTRATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
SITE CLEANUP PROF'LS, SUMMARY OF FINAL DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS (2013),
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/l0/04/LSP%20SUMMARY%200F%2FINA
L%20DISCIPLINARY%20ACTIONS.pdf.
312. Mass. Consultant Interview 3, supra note 252 (noting that the need for LSP
opinions to "have weight and value in commerce" was one antidote to the "fox guarding the
henhouse" problem); Mass. Client Interview 1 (May 11, 2018) ("[W]e're intending to sell the
projects; we're looking to think about what the next buyer is going to say; we're looking for
closure.").
313. E.g., Mass. Consultant Interview 8, supra note 73 ("[T]he regulations provide
a framework for how to get a site effective[ly] cleaned up, and that will pass a DEP audit, and
it allows the private sector to manage that whole process, the checks and balances being, you
know, the audits.., that keep the LSPs honest in applying the regulations.").
314. Letter from Cole E. Worthy, LSPA President, and Wendy Rundle, LSPA Exec.
Dir. to Secretary Richard Sullivan, Exec. Office of Energy and Envtl. Affairs 1 (Jan. 24, 2013)
(on file with author). One LSP provided a more detailed description of how regulatory context
matters when he disagrees with a client about what needs to be done at a site:
I've had situations where a client has said to me... "if you're going to be
my LSP, we're not going to take that step." And I'll say, "I'm sorry, I can't
do that. If that's what you're saying, you can fire me and I won't be your
LSP anymore." But then... I've never actually gotten fired in that
situation, because I say, "here's why I need to do the right thing and here's
why you need to the right thing as well .... "I mean, I think by me saying
to them you have to do the right thing, here's what the law says, I think
they realize that by them firing me I can put a memo into my file that
says... "I was terminated right after telling the client they need to do x,
y, and z." So if I ever got audited and this piece of information came
forward, that would reflect very badly ......
Mass. Consultant Interview 2, supra note 199. The consultant added that his own values
would prevent him from taking actions that were not protective of public health. But,
importantly, the presence of a regulatory structure removes the need for the consultant to
frame disagreement with the client in moralistic terms, and instead allows a discussion based
on client interests.
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work and would face workload challenges taking on intense but short-term tasks,
government entities can draw upon a cadre of highly experienced, specialized
experts. 15 And despite all the complaints about CEQA costs and delays, that cadre
of experts does move through a tremendous amount of work.3 16 But the CEQA
system, like the Massachusetts LSP program, retains important checks on private
activity. Final decisions remain the responsibility of public entities.3 17 And
permissive standing requirements mean that the court system provides an active
check on compliance.318 In California, as in Massachusetts, the constraints of public
law are not lost, and, indeed, one recurring complaint of industry insiders is that they
are overly powerful. 19
These dynamics underscore the potential for symbiotic relationships
between privatization and regulation. That potential is disregarded by much of the
privatization literature, which assumes that assigning tasks to private entities
necessarily limits public authority.3 20 And that assumption is not surprising; by
definition, privatization does take tasks away from the public sphere, and its
advocates often employ explicitly anti-governmental rhetoric and extoll the value of
private competition. 2' Given that rhetoric, coupling privatization with more robust
regulation might seem odd.3 22 But the Massachusetts and California experiences
315. See supra notes 40-49, 175-77 and accompanying text (describing the
expertise of consultants generally and of CEQA consultants specifically).
316. See Governor's Office of Planning and Research, State Clearinghouse
Summary of Postings, September 1-15, 2017 (2017) (providing annual statistics on
completed CEQA documents).
317. California Native Plant Soc'y v. City of Santa Cruz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 586
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) ("An agency may utilize staff or consultants to prepare the EIR but it
must use its independent judgment in considering the information.") (internal citations
omitted).
318. See Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005,
1011-15 (Cal. 2011) (upholding broad standing requirements, which extend to businesses as
well as public interest groups and government entities).
319. See JENNIFER HERNANDEZ ET AL., IN THE NAME OF THE ENVIRONMENT (2015).
But see Sean B. Hecht, Anti-CEQA Lobbyists Turn to Empirical Analysis, but Are Their
Conclusions Sound?, LEGAL PLANET (Sept. 28, 2015), http://legal-planet.org/2015/
09/28/anti-ceqa-lobbyists-turn-to-empirical-analysis-but-are-their-conclusions- sound/
(questioning Hernandez et al.'s methodology and conclusions).
320. But see Freeman, supra note 299; Minow, supra note 98, at 1230. Both
Freeman and Minow provide conceptual accounts of successful public-private collaborations.
My additional contributions are to provide a more specific example showing how that success
can be achieved and to explore the potential role of the private sector in bolstering public
norms.
321. See Matthew Diller, Going Private The Future of Social Welfare Policy, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 491, 495-96 (2002) (describing this rhetoric); Freeman, supra note
299, at 1291-94.
322. That coupling is not a new idea, of course; much of utility law is founded on
the premise that privatized functions should be coupled with public regulatory oversight. But
extending that coupling outside the utility context, where natural monopolies provide a ready
justification for regulatory oversight, and into realms where businesses compete is a less
accepted idea.
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illustrate another possibility, which is that privatization can be symbiotic with a
robust regulatory scheme. If private delegates are embedded, as Massachusetts LSPs
and California CEQA consultants are, in accountability networks involving robust
public and private oversight, privatization can produce its theoretical benefits
without creating its traditionally-feared costs.
Indeed, both case studies reveal ways in which partial privatization can
actually bolster a regulatory scheme. One benefit can arise from shifts in workload.
In Massachusetts, one goal of the LSP program was to free Massachusetts DEP from
heavy involvement in the details of minor waste sites so staff could focus on larger
problems and on improving the overall regulatory program. 23 As one regulator put
it, when describing the pre- 1993 program, "our own staff wasn't happy ... because
we were having to spend a lot of time on what we thought were really minor
problems and we weren't getting to the sites that we thought presented the highest
risks to public health and the environment." " Shifting authority to LSPs helped
address this problem. As one consultant put it, "I really like the privatized system.
It allows [Massachusetts DEP] to do a lot more ... under the same budget."3 25
The second benefit can arise from a private role in advancing public values.
In the classic story, these things are naturally opposed, and even in some of the more
creative alternative accounts, the hope is that privatization might help public values
diffuse into the private sphere. 26 Indeed, much of the literature on privatization
emphasizes the importance of using additional legal constraints to minimize the
slack between public values and contractor performance.3 27 This is sensible advice,
but something different has happened with consultants, at least in California. There,
private-sector consultants strive to operate, at least sometimes, as the guardians of
public values. They have adopted the idealistic goals underlying an important and
controversial public law as a professional mission statement3 28 and recruited
employees who identify with those values. 29 They then explain those values to
clients-many of whom are public sector employees.330 More broadly, both in their
client representation and in their advocacy, they have sought to strengthen the
regulatory frameworks under which they operate.33'
None of these observations undermine the extensive literature raising
concerns about privatization. Nor should they alleviate concerns that private
323. See MASS. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 149, at A-I to A-2 (describing
the program's goals).
324. Mass. Regulator Interview 4, supra note 250.
325. Mass. Consultant Interview 7, supra note 204.
326. See Freeman, supra note 299, at 1290.
327. See, e.g., Nina Mendelson, Six Simple Steps to Increase Contractor
Accountability, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 22, at 253-60.
328. See Ass'N OF ENVTL. PROF'LS, https://www.califaep.org/ (last visited June 21,
2018) ("[W]e are a non-profit association of public and private sector professionals with a
common interest in serving the principles underlying the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA) which include environmental assessment, analysis, public disclosure, and
reporting.").
329. See supra notes 206-217 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Section JJJ.B.2.
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interests will sometimes self-interestedly shape public law in ways that provide little
public benefit. Instead, the narrower points are that there are alternative, and more
promising, pathways for privatization than those emphasized by existing literature;
that privatization and public regulation can boost each other; and that private
attention to public norms can come from profit incentives and professional culture
as well as from public-law constraints or contractual terms.
C. Social Movements
Just as an inquiry into environmental consulting offers qualified support
for partial privatization, it also places the institutionalization of the environmental
movement in a more positive light.
Viewing institutionalization as a benefit departs from some traditional
views of the environmental movement, and of social movements more generally. In
one classic critique, institutionalization means selling out. A famous quote from
Dave Foreman, the founder of EarthFirst, succinctly captures this perspective: "Too
many environmentalists," he argued, "have grown to resemble bureaucrats-pale
from too much indoor light; weak from sitting too long behind desks; co-opted by
too many politicians .... By playing a 'professional' role in the economic rational
game, we, too, acquiesce in the destruction of the Earth. 33 2 Foreman's quote
resembles critiques offered by many other activists, both within and outside the
environmental movement, and by academics who argue that professionalization
disempowers the people that a movement is supposed to serve and saps movements
of their vitality.33 Closely related are critiques primarily associated with the
environmental justice movement; the movement has argued that the technocratic
discourse of professionalized environmental management disempowers grassroots
voices from disadvantaged communities. 34  For years, defenders of
professionalization have offered counterarguments; they have claimed that no
movement can achieve lasting gains without using professionalized staff and
working with existing power structures.335 But debates about the appropriate balance
between professionalization and grassroots activism continue to rage.
33 6
332. SHABECOFF, supra note 125, at 252.
333. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 125; Claire Riegelman, Environmentalism: A
Symbiotic Relationship Between a Social Movement and U.S. Law?, 16 Mo. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REv. 522, 524 (2009) (arguing that institutionalization has cost the environmental
movement its public involvement and, therefore, its status as a social movement). For a
summary of the extensive nonenvironmental work on this subject-much of which is
significantly more nuanced than a short synopsis can convey-see generally Scott L.
Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 360 (2017).
334. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 132, at 689; Fine & Owen, supra note 41, at 936-
38, 965-70; Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv 103, 103-107 (1996).
335. See, e.g., David Schlosberg & John S. Dryzek, Political Strategies of
American Environmentalism: Inclusion and Beyond, 15 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 787, 788-
89 (2002) (quoting environmental group leaders who argue in favor of insider strategies).
336. See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, NAMING THE PROBLEM: WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO
COUNTER EXTREMISM AND ENGAGE AMERICANS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING 6-
7 (2013).
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Environmental consultants have never been featured in those debates. The
primary focus, both within the environment-specific literature and within the social-
movement literature more generally, has been upon activist organizations, with
critics and defenders analyzing the composition and staffing of those organizations
and their relationships with bureaucracies, elected politicians, and regulated
businesses.33 7 Even in the literature that directly focuses on businesses, social
movements, and the environment, that focus on activists and regulated entities
remains, and environmental consultants are absent from the discussion.338 Yet
consultants have obvious relevance to these debates. The typical consultant is a
highly trained professional whose paid career is to communicate-often in data
tables and dry, technical prose-with businesses and bureaucrats as they work to
ensure compliance with the hard-won results of environmentalists' political
campaigns. 33 9 An environmental consultant is thus the pinnacle of the environmental
movement's professionalization.
To an advocate of stronger grassroots environmentalism, this may sound
troubling. Yet a close look at the work of environmental consultants makes it hard
to imagine the environmental movement succeeding without people playing this
kind of role. There are several reasons why.
First, environmental consultants help clients figure out how to comply with
environmental laws. That observation may sound too obvious to be worth
mentioning, but it matters. Though basic values questions do often arise, the primary
arguments against environmental laws usually come down to cost and complexity,
with critics alleging that regulated entities become unnecessarily and expensively
entangled in legal webs.340 An industry that can help untangle those webs, and can
do so at billable rates that are often less than half of those of attorneys,3 41 therefore
has an important role in making environmental law workable. That is not a trivial
accomplishment. Sometimes the frustrations of regulated entities are just
337. See Cummings, supra note 333 (summarizing social movement literature);
see, e.g., Jonathan P. Doh & Terrence R. Guay, Corporate Social Responsibility, Public
Policy, and NGO Activism in Europe and the United States: An Institutional-Stakeholder
Perspective, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 47, 47 (2006); Mariette van Huijstee & Pieter Glasbergen,
NGOs Moving Business: An Analysis of Contrasting Strategies, 49 Bus. & Soc'y 591, 591-
93 (2010).
338. See Sarah A. Soule, Social Movements and Markets, Industries, and Firms, 33
ORG. STUD. 1715, 1715 (2012) (reviewing literature on social movements and business
organizations); Erin M. Reid & Michael W. Toffel, Responding to Public and Private
Politics: Corporate Disclosure of Climate Change Strategies, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. 1157,
1157-62 (2009) (summarizing writing in this field); see, e.g., Schlosberg & Dryzek, supra
note 335, at 787-89; Ian Bogdan Vasi & Brayden C. King, Social Movements, Risk
Perceptions, and Economic Outcomes: The Effect of Primary and Secondary Stakeholder
Activism on Firms'Perceived Environmental Risk and Financial Performance, 77 AM. Soc.
REv. 573,573 (2012).
339. See supra notes 37-73 and accompanying text (describing consultants' work).
340. See LAZARUS, supra note 37, at 99 (describing Ronald Reagan's reservations
about environmental law).
341. Mass. Client Interview 1, supra note 312.
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strategically exaggerated griping, 4 but for many businesses and public entities,
environmental compliance is a genuine headache, which requires serious and
sustained work.343 A cadre of people who can help businesses and governments
navigate those challenges is therefore an indispensable bulwark against the
backlashes that inevitably beset any social movement.344
Relatedly, that professional cadre can also compensate against the inability
of movements to provide sustained attention to all the details of environmental
compliance. Movements tend to draw their most powerful energy from short-lived,
high-profile controversies.3 45 For example, a project like the Keystone Pipeline is a
classic rallying point for the environmental movement.3 46 Yet environmental
challenges rarely involve just a few spectacular events; instead, many modern
environmental challenges arise from the accretionary effects of thousands of
individual actions and decisions. 47 And while the proliferation of local
environmental groups, often armed with petition rights and citizen suit provisions,
has enabled the environmental movement to contest many of these fronts, its
resources still are too limited for it to participate in every decision where
environmental compliance is at stake.3 48 Moreover, much of environmental law
attempts to prevent problems from occurring, which is a salutary goal but also means
avoiding exactly the sorts of debacles that could arouse political support.
3 49
Consequently, implementing environmental law often means applying sustained and
somewhat meticulous attention to management challenges that have not risen, and
hopefully never will rise, to a level of public salience. That creates a profound
342. See Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental
Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 176-84 (1997) (describing chronic overestimation of
compliance costs).
343. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 767 & n.23 (2003) (citing
sources on the prevalence of noncompliance and the belief among corporate environmental
managers that achieving full compliance is difficult, if not impossible).
344. See generally LAZARUS, supra note 37 (describing repeated cycles of
advancement and backlash).
345. See Farber, supra note 3, at 66 (describing the importance of periods of
heightened public attention).
346. See Matthew Yglesias, The Difference Between Organizing and Policy
Analysis, SLATE (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/01/
24/keystone xl is a huge-organizing-success.html (noting that the Keystone Pipeline
helped environmental groups rally support).
347. See Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small
Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 143-44 (2012).
348. See David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial
Politics in Environmental Litigation, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 52 (2018) (describing how resource
limits force environmental groups to pick their battles); see also Robert J. Brulle, The Climate
Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis of Lobbying Spending on Climate Change in the USA, 2000 to
2016, 149 CLIMATIC CHANGE 289, 289 (2018) (showing that industries vastly outspent
environmental organizations).
349. See Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295,
1298-99 (2008) (noting this problem with preventive regulation).
2019] CONSULTANTS 877
mismatch between the capabilities of a nonprofessionalized grassroots movement
and the goals it often wishes to accomplish.350
Perhaps some of those challenges could simply be handled by regulators
and regulated entities, with environmental groups occasionally weighing in. And, in
fact, there are professionals, like corporate health and safety managers, who work
within regulated entities and play important facilitative roles in ensuring
compliance.35 ' But on the whole, a basic environmentalist-regulator-regulated
model is short of facilitators; it lacks any entity with strong incentives to see each of
the other parts of the system succeed. By contrast, an environmental consultant,
works at a firm that depends upon both environmental law and a thriving business
sector for its viability,352 is likely staffed by people who share the environmental
movement's basic goals,353 and will have at least some of the professional education
and expertise to maintain credibility with the other participants in environmental
policy implementation. That will not always occur, of course; some consultants do
shoddy work and a few have gone to prison for professional malfeasance.354 But the
basic incentive structure under which the consulting field operates encourages it to
strengthen environmental law and to do so in ways that grassroots activism can
support but cannot replicate. Those benefits of institutionalization do not mean that
grassroots activism is unimportant or that tensions between activism and
institutionalization are any less real. But they do explain how professionalization
and institutionalization could be essential to a social movement's lasting success.
CONCLUSION
One of the most intriguing questions about regulation-both within and
outside the environmental field-is why it often succeeds. The United States now
has cleaner air, cleaner rivers, and fewer uncontrolled hazardous waste sites than it
did in the dawn of the environmental law era, and it has coupled those changes with
massive economic growth.355 While huge unsolved challenges remain, they tend to
350. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1153, 1156 (2009)
(noting this challenge of turning moments of attention into lasting change).
351. As one consultant-turned-client noted, the consultant's primary client contact,
at least when working for a larger company, is often an environmental manager and therefore
a person who is likely to share the consultants' professional orientation toward environmental
compliance. Cal. Client Interview 1 (June 12, 2019).
352. See LIFSCHUTZ, supra note 7, at 5-7 (noting that corporate profits and robust
government regulation both help the industry).
353. See supra notes 222-231 and accompanying text.
354. See, e.g., United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 464 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding
a conviction for illegally filling wetlands); Jason Fazone & Cynthia Dizikes, 2 Sentenced for
Falsifying Reports on Soil Samples at Hunter's Point, S.F. GATE (May 3, 2018),
https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Two-sentenced-for-falsifying-reports-on-soil-
12886564.php; Roger Pearson, Consultant Pleads Guilty to Illegal Relocation of Frogs, CAL.
ENVTL. INSIDER, Nov. 30, 2000.
355. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 (2011) (finding major gains, with value greatly outweighing the
associated economic costs); William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today Has the Clean
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occur for problems, like greenhouse gas emissions or non-point-source water
pollution, that have fallen outside the traditional boundaries of regulatory
oversight.3 56 Theoretically, these achievements are somewhat puzzling; many
models of political and administrative behavior would have predicted much less
success.3 5 7 It is therefore important, particularly at a time when many political
leaders seem eager to dismantle public regulation, to understand the features of
regulatory systems that have allowed these successes to occur.
This Article has focused on one portion of that inquiry. It demonstrates that
private environmental consultants, motivated partly by profit and partly by values,
strive to play quiet but significant roles in improving regulatory governance. More
generally, it demonstrates that the focus of academic and policymaking debates,
including discussions of privatization and of the institutionalization of social
movements, should expand beyond the traditional foci on activists, regulated
business, and governments, and should also examine the roles of business entities
that might help bolster regulatory regimes. I make no claim that private consultants
will always play those salutary roles or that they are unique in doing so; nor have I
attempted to quantify the extent of their influence. Additional research into other
parts of the environmental consulting field, and into other kinds of business entities,
may reveal parallel dynamics or very different forms of influence. But at the very
least, these examples show that private businesses can help privatization to succeed,
a social movement to endure, and functional regulation to take place.
APPENDIX I: TABLE OF INTERVIEWS
Francisco)
Scoping Interview 2 April 27, 2017 envtl. consultant telephone
Scoping Interview 3 May 5, 2017 envtl. attorney telephone
Scoping Interview 4 May 17, 2017 envtl. attorney in person (San
Francisco)
Scoping Interview 5 May 19, 2017 envtl. consultant telephone
Scoping Interview 6 July 21, 2017 envtl. consultant telephone
Water Act Been a Success?, 55 ALA. L. REv. 537, 569-78 (2004) (comparing Clean Water
Act benefits and costs).
356. See Dave Owen, After the TMDLs, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 845, 858 (2016)
(describing the Clean Water Act's exemptions for nonpoint source pollution).
357. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 3, at 59 ("Yet, from the perspective of positive
political theory, the puzzle is not that Congress produces public goods such as clean air so
inefficiently, but that Congress manages to produce any public goods at all.").
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Scoping Interview 7 September 1, envtl. consultant telephone
2017
Scoping Interview 8 September 21, envtl. consultant telephone
2017
California
Cal. Consultant September 29, envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 1 2017
Cal. Consultant October 6, 2017 envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 2
Cal. Consultant October 9, 2017 envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 3
Cal. Consultant October 10, 2017 envtl, consultant telephone
Interview 4
Cal. Consultant October 13, 2017 envtl. consultant in person (San
Interview 5 Francisco)
Cal. Consultant October 17, 2017 envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 6
Cal. Consultant October 24, 2017 envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 7
Cal. Consultant November 8, envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 8 2017
Cal. Consultant November 16, envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 9 2017
Cal. Consultant November 21, envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 10 2017
Cal. Consultant November 30, envtl. consultant telephone
Interview 11 2017
Cal. Attorney Interview October 10, 2017 private firm envtl. in person (San
1 attorney Francisco)
Cal. Attorney Interview October 25, 2017 government envtl. telephone
2 attorney
Cal. Attorney Interview October 30, 2017 private firm envtl. telephone
3 attorney
Cal. Attorney Interview November 1, envtl. group attorney telephone
4 2017
Cal. Attorney Interview November 6, private firm envtl. in person (San
5 2017 attorney Francisco)
Cal. Attorney Interview November 7, government envtl. telephone
6 2017 attorney
Cal. Attorney Interview November 8, private firm envtl. telephone
7 2017 attorney
Cal. Attorney Interview November 8, private firm envtl. telephone
8 2017 attorney
Cal. Attorney Interview November 8, private firm envtl. telephone
9 2017 attorney
Cal. Attorney Interview November 9, private firm envtl. telephone
10 2017 attorney
Cal. Attorney Interview November 15, government envtl. telephone
11 2017 attorney
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Cal. Attorney Interview June 4, 2019 envtl. group attorney telephone
12
Cal. Attorney Interview June 17, 2019 private envtl. attorney telephone
13
Cal. Client Interview 1 June 12, 2019 local government telephone
planner
Cal. Client Interview 2 November 20, energy infrastructure telephone
2017 development company
] ]_employee
Massachusetts
Mass. Consultant November 30, envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 1 2017
Mass. Consultant December 5, envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 2 2017
Mass. Consultant January 31, 2018 envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 3
Mass. Consultant January 31, 2018 envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 4
Mass. Consultant February 1, 2018 envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 5
Mass. Consultant February 1, 2018 envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 6
Mass. Consultant February 1, 2018 envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 7
Mass. Consultant February 1, 2018 envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 8
Mass. Consultant February 14, envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 9 2018
Mass. Consultant February 28, envtl. consultant (LSP) telephone
Interview 10 2018
Mass. Attorney December 11, private firm envtl. telephone
Interview 1 2017 attorney
Mass. Attorney December 14, private firm envtl. telephone
Interview 2 2017 attorney
Mass. Attorney December 18, private firm envtl. telephone
Interview 3 2017 attorney
Mass. Attorney April 19, 2018 private firm envtl. telephone
Interview 4 attorney
Mass. Regulator December 7, regulator telephone
Interview 1 2017
Mass. Regulator December 8, regulator telephone
Interview 2 2017
Mass. Regulator December 14, regulator telephone
Interview 3 2017
Mass. Regulator December 18, regulator telephone
Interview 4 2017
Mass. Regulator December 21, regulator telephone
Interview 5 2017
Mass. Client Interview 1 May 11, 2018 real estate developer telephone
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Mass. Client Interview 2 May 17, 2018 real estate developer telephone
Mass. Advocate December 31, envtl. advocate telephone
Interview 1 2018
Mass. Advocate May 15, 2019 public health advocate telephone
Interview 2
Mass. Advocate May 16, 2019 community advocate telephone
Interview 3
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROFESSIONALS DOCUMENTS RELATED TO
CEQA AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Document Date
Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Global June, 2007
Climate Change in CEQA documents
California Community-Wide Greenhouse Gas Baseline Inventory Protocol June, 2011
White Paper
SB375 Consistency and CEQA May, 2012
Forecasting Community-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emission and Setting May, 2012
Reduction Targets
AEP Climate Change Committee's "The California Supplement to the United December, 2013
States Community-Wide Greenhouse Gas Emissions Protocol"
Beyond 2020: The Challenge of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Planning by March, 2015
Local Governments in California
Amicus Brief, Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego September, 2015
Association of Governments (jointly filed with many other organizations) 3 5 8
Letter from AEP Climate Change Committee to California Air Resources July, 2016
Board re: Comments on CARB's June 17, 2016, 2030 Target Scoping Plan
Update
Final White Paper: Beyond 2020 and Newhall: A Field Guide to New CEQA October, 2016
Greenhouse Gas Thresholds and Climate Action Plan Targets for California
Comment Letter on CARB's January 20, 2017 Draft 2017 Climate Change April, 2017
Scoping Plan Update, The Proposed Strategy for Achieving California's 2030
Greenhouse Gas Target
Production, Consumption and Lifecycle Greenhouse Gas Inventories: August, 2017
Implications for CEQA and Climate Action Plans
358. 397 P.3d 989 (Cal. 2017) (No. S223603), 2015 WL 7313506.
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APPENDIX III: CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROFESSIONALS DOCUMENTS RELATED TO CEQA STREAMLINING
AND RELATED REFORMS
Document Date
Legislative Proposals to Enhance Five Key Areas of the California September, 2011
Environmental Quality Act (prepared by the Enhanced CEQA Action
Team)
Letter to Christopher Calfee Re: Comments on the Proposed Addition February 24, 2012
to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) Guidelines
Implementing SB 226 (Simitian)
Letter to Christopher Calfee, Governor's Office of Planning and June 1, 2012
Research, re: Comments on Revised Proposed Amendments to Public
Resources Code Section 21094.5.5
American Planning Association, California Chapter; Association of August 30, 2013
Environmental Professionals; and Enhanced CEQA Action Team,
Recommendations for Updating the State CEQA Guidelines
Amicus Brief, CaliJornia Building Industry Ass'n v. Bay Area Air April 15, 2014
Quality Management District (with the California Chapter of the
American Planning Association)
3 59
Letter to The Honorable Bob Wieckowski, Chair, Senate Environmental April 8, 2015
Quality Committee, re: SB 122 (Jackson & Hill) - Support
Amicus Brief, Sierra Club v. County of Fresno et al.3 60  May 6, 2015
"Taking CEQA Forward": Results from the 2015 AEP Institute Event July, 2015
Letter to Chris Calfee, Senior Counsel, and Holly Roberson, Land Use October 12, 2015
Counsel, Governor's Office of Planning and Research, re: AEP's
Comments on OPR's August 11, 2015 Proposed Updates to the CEQA
Guidelines
Letter from Devin Muto, AEP, to Holly Roberson, Governor's Office December 18, 2015
of Planning and Research, Re: AEP Comments on Discussion Draft:
Proposed Changes to Appendix G of the CEQA Guidelines
Incorporating Tribal Cultural Resources
Letter to Christopher Calfee, Senior Counsel, Governor's Office of February 29, 2016
Planning and Research, Re: AEP Comments on OPR's January 20,2016
Revised Proposed Updates to the CEQA Guidelines on Evaluating
Transportation Impacts in CEQA
359. 362 P.3d 792 (Cal. 2015) (No. S213478), 2014 WL 1765287.
360. 431 P.3d 1151 (Cal. 2018) (No. S219783), 2015 WL 13811870.
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Letter to The Honorable Das Williams, Chair, Assembly Natural March 30, 2016
Resources Committee, re: Assembly Bill 1569 (McCarty) - Support
Letter to The Honorable Das Williams, Chair, Assembly Natural March 30, 2016
Resources Committee, re: Assembly Bill 1886 (Steinorth) - Suggested
Amendments
Letter to Christopher Calfee, Senior Counsel, Governor's Office of November 21, 2016
Planning and Research, Re: AEP Support and Comments to OPR
Discussion Draft of Proposed Amendments to CEQA Guidelines
Section 15126.2(a) and Consideration of Significant Effects and
Hazards in the CEQA Guidelines
884
